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Before the COVID-19 pandemic erupted, governments’ pledges for sustainable development were flourishing, 
most notably as countries signed up to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, 
the devastating health and economic impacts of COVID-19 on the decade-long progress to fight poverty have 
forced governments to rethink their socioeconomic models so that they do not compromise human health 
and ecosystems. In this context, voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) are being increasingly recognized as 
potentially transformative tools for governments to realize their sustainability commitments. 
This 4th Flagship Report aims to provide an understanding of the role of government as a vehicle to drive the 
adoption of VSS. The effectiveness of VSS to contribute to sustainable development partly depends on their 
degree of adoption by economic operators. In this respect, governments can play a significant role through 
public procurement and trade policy.
The integration of VSS into public procurement and trade policies is potentially a powerful means to upscale 
their adoption. Public procurement represents, on average, 12 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and up to 30 per cent of 
GDP in developing countries. Given the magnitude of such spending, in combination with the pressing need 
for sustainable production and consumption, sustainable public procurement (SPP) has become imperative. 
In addition, trade policy is increasingly being used to pursue non-trade objectives, including those relating to 
sustainability. 
This report seeks to answer the following key questions:
• What are the determinants of VSS adoption at country level? 
• How can public procurement and trade policy serve to increase VSS uptake, and how do they contribute 
to the effectiveness of VSS?
• What are the key considerations and implications of VSS integration into SPP and trade policy?
Based on these questions, the report analyses VSS adoption dynamics and trends, and the drivers for their 
adoption in SPP and trade policy. The following are its major observations.
VSS are gaining ground, especially among diversified, export-oriented economies with relatively 
well-functioning governments and higher levels of development. 
The number of VSS, their geographical coverage and the market shares of certified products are, overall, 
increasing at the global level. However, while VSS are being actively adopted in all countries, their adoption 
levels vary greatly across countries. VSS adoption scores are more or less aligned with income levels: large 
developed and middle-income countries tend to have more VSS. Thus, Brazil, China, the United States and 
many European countries have adopted many VSS;. middle-income countries such as Viet Nam, Indonesia 
and India also score fairly high on VSS adoption, suggesting that an export-oriented industrialization policy 
can influence higher VSS activity. Similarly, low-income countries, such as Ethiopia and the United Republic of 
Tanzania, also score high in VSS adoption due to their export commodities, such as coffee, which tend to be 
certified by multiple certificates. Generally, it is found that open economies with diversified economic sectors, 
relatively well-functioning governments and a high of development tend to adopt more VSS.
Increase in VSS adoption is driven by consumer and business demand, and by their integration into 
public policy. 
Markets with a relatively high level of consumer demand for sustainable products can lead to an increased 
adoption of VSS. Business demand can also increase VSS uptake, as VSS can serve as a means for 
differentiation and reputational risk management, and as proof of compliance with due diligence requirements 
x
or with government regulations. Depending on the structure of the economic sector, and more specifically on 
its level of concentration, VSS can also spread more or less easily, as business actors with strong bargaining 
power can influence other actors along the value chain to take up VSS. Lastly, SPP and trade policy play a 
particularly important role in the integration of VSS into public policy. 
SPP can strengthen the design of VSS. 
This will depend on how VSS are integrated into legal frameworks, and on the criteria established to recognize 
VSS in the context of SPP. Considering that procurement is involved in many segments of the value chain (i.e. 
sourcing of a commodity, purchasing the commodity, and quality control), the integration of VSS into SPP 
could foster the supply of sustainable products. It would also provide governments with additional enforcement 
mechanisms, and induce efforts to promote capacity-building. This in turn could create a spillover effect on 
the community of VSS, both in terms of scaling them up and making them more reliable and credible with 
regard to how they are designed and how they operate. This report identifies three challenges to enhancing the 
potential of VSS in SPP. First, procurement policies should strengthen requirements for the recognition of VSS. 
Currently, the integration of VSS into SPP involves requirements that are related mainly to their standard-setting 
processes, but rarely to their standards enforcement procedures, such as monitoring, conformity assessment, 
complaints handling and sanctions. Requirements relating to these other components need to be further 
developed. Second, there are no, or very few, VSS available for products for public procurement in several 
prominent sectors (e.g. the health sector). Third, there is a risk that SPP discriminates by excluding products or 
services of similar environmental and social performance but that do not hold certificates due to the high costs 
of certification.  
Free trade agreements, preferential trade agreements, market access regulations and export 
promotion measures are relevant instruments to increase VSS uptake.
Between 2010 and 2017, VSS have been increasingly incorporated into some free trade agreements (FTAs), 
although it may be too early to detect a clear trend. Still, such inclusion tends to be more prominent in FTAs 
involving the European Union (EU), which reflects the Union’s commitment to promoting fair and ethical trade 
schemes in its trade policies. In preferential trade agreements (PTAs), and in generalized systems/schemes of 
Preferences (GSP) in particular, it has been observed that both VSS and GSP schemes aim to foster sustainable 
development and good governance, and proposals are discussed to integrate VSS into the GSP of the European 
Union. Moreover, making market access conditional on certification and developing export promotion measures 
in favour of certification can contribute to further upscaling VSS adoption.
Integrating VSS into SPP and trade policies might also produce several challenges.
A strong increase in demand for VSS could create capacity issues, with some VSS schemes lacking the capacity 
to deal with the increased demand. Besides, the current lack of availability of VSS for products in the prominent 
sectors of public procurement might lead to the creation of additional labels, thereby aggravating the problem 
of a proliferation of VSS. This could increase confusion for consumers and economic actors in distinguishing 
between credible and non-credible VSS. There is also a possible risk of proliferation of recognition systems with 
more or less similar requirements but also possible small differences in requirements. This would make it difficult 
for various VSS schemes to comply with them all. Additionally, if an increase in business demand for VSS does 
not align with consumer demand for VSS, it might lead to the problem of over-certification. Moreover, there is 
a possible distributional effect of upscaling VSS related to the “stuck to the bottom” problem, whereby some 
producers, especially in least developed countries (LDCs), are excluded from the VSS dynamics as they cannot 
afford high certification costs, which present a significant barrier to their adoption of VSS.
This report explores governments’ role in upscaling VSS adoption through SPP and trade policy. It shows that 
VSS can generate significant impacts on the ground and transform market dynamics. Hence, boosting the 
uptake of VSS could improve their overall effectiveness in contributing to sustainability on a large scale.
INTRODUCTION
VOLUNTARY SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY
In 2013, the United Nations Forum on Sustainability 
Standards (UNFSS) published its 1st Flagship 
Report which presented an array of salient voluntary 
sustainability standards (VSS) and public policy 
issues, and developed an inventory of some of the 
leading initiatives working on VSS. In September 
2015, the United Nations Member States adopted 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which 
comprised a new set of sustainable development 
goals (SDGs). The Agenda stipulates that the SDGs 
“are integrated and indivisible and balance the 
three dimensions of sustainable development: the 
economic, social and environmental”. Accordingly 
governments, businesses and civil society are 
encouraged to promote synergies between their 
actions towards its implementation.  
The UNFSS (2013: 3) defines VSS as “standards 
specifying requirements that producers, traders, 
manufacturers, retailers or service providers may be 
asked to meet, relating to a wide range of sustainability 
metrics, including respect for basic human rights, 
worker health and safety, the environmental impacts 
of production, community relations, land use planning 
and others”. They thus aim to promote sustainability 
in global value chains through standard-setting and 
monitoring practices. Most of these standards try 
to cover all dimensions of sustainability – social, 
environmental and economic – although some VSS 
schemes focus only on certain specific dimensions of 
sustainability. While most VSS have been developed by 
the private sector, UNEP (2012) differentiates between 
public and private VSS. Private VSS, implemented 
mainly by NGOs, industry groups or multi-stakeholder 
groups, typically provide indications on the social and 
environmental aspects of products. Examples include 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Rainforest 
Alliance (RA) and the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC). Public VSS, on the other hand, have emerged 
from public sector initiatives. Examples include the 
Blue Angel of the German Government, the Nordic 
Swan of the inter-parliamentary Nordic Council, and 
the European Union’s Ecolabel. In the literature, VSS 
are sometimes also referred to as “sustainability 
standards”, “ecolabels”, “certification schemes”, 
“eco-certification”, or “voluntary market-based 
certification programmes”. In this report, these terms 
are used interchangeably, but the preferred term is 
VSS, which encompasses all certification schemes 
that aim to improve sustainability. In essence, they 
are voluntary, and have consensus-based standard-
setting procedures, regardless of their public or 
private origin.
VSS, along with international standards, such as 
those developed by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the International Social and 
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(ISEAL),6 may be expected to play an increasingly 
important role in complementing governments’ efforts 
towards achieving the SDGs.7  In a world characterized 
by an exponential growth in international trade and, 
more importantly, changes in the nature of trade 
(Hoekman, 2014; Hamilton et al., 2012; Cattaneo et 
al., 2010), VSS can be, among other instruments, 
particularly relevant in contributing to the realization 
of the SDGs, since they operate globally and connect 
developing countries to developed countries through 
values chains (Ponte, 2019). 
It is evident that VSS can directly contribute to 
achieving SDG 12 on sustainable consumption and 
production. In essence, they aim to foster more 
sustainable and transparent practices among actors 
at all levels of global value chains to help make global 
production more sustainable (WWF, 2017; DIE, 2015). 
However, VSS can also contribute to other SDGs. 
A broad study by the UNFSS (2018) compared the 
requirements of 122 VSS with 10 pre-selected SDGs, 
and their targets and indicators. Results showed 
strong complementarities between VSS requirements 
and SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth 
in particular, with 102 VSS requirements being 
relevant to this SDG. Among these 102 relevant 
requirements, the ones with the highest coverage all 
relate to decent work. Half of those are directly linked 
to International Labour Organization (ILO) standards, 
meaning that VSS have complementarities not only 
with SDG 8, particularly with target 8 on labour 
rights and safe working conditions, but also with the 
international labour rights regime more broadly (Marx 
et al., 2017). Secondly, the study found that 78 VSS 
requirements match with SDG 12 on sustainable 
consumption and production, particularly with 
targets 4, 5 and 6 on issues of waste management, 
use of chemicals, training of staff on sustainability 
issues, and development of environmental and social 
management systems. Thirdly, 60 VSS requirements 
were found to be relevant to SDG 15 on life on land, 
mostly in relation to targets 2, 3, 5 and 7, which deal 
with biodiversity, quality, contamination and erosion 
6   ISEAL is a global membership association for sustainability 
standards and certification systems. Its members are 
supported by international accreditation bodies, which are 
required to meet accepted international best practices. For 
a full list of members, see: www.isealalliance.org. 
7  For a general introduction on the SDGs, see the open 
online course on the SDGs at: https://www.edx.org/course/
the-un-sustainable-development-goals-an-interdisci. 
of soils, sustainable use and management of forests 
and nature resources or ecosystems, and protection 
of wildlife, respectively. 
Moreover, in some cases VSS can even be indicators 
of progress on some SDGs. This is the case for SDG 
15 – life on land – target 2 on sustainable management 
of forests, for example. This target is monitored by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), which uses, among other indicators, 
the area of certified forests as a measure of progress 
on SDG 15.2 (FAO, 2019). Although research shows 
that VSS have the most complementarities with SDGs 
8, 12 and 15, they also share similar requirements 
with other SDGs, including SDG 2 on zero hunger, 
food security and sustainable agriculture, SDG 5 on 
gender equality, SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation, 
SDG 13 on climate action, and SDG 14 on life below 
water. Lastly, VSS can also help achieve SDG 17 
on partnerships for the goals, since they promote 
multi-stakeholder participation, transparency, 
knowledge exchange, public-private partnerships 
and sustainable investments (WWF, 2017). These 
similarities between the requirements of VSS and the 
SDGs, their targets and indicators suggest that an 
increased uptake of and compliance with VSS would 
contribute to progress in achieving the SDGs.8 
Indeed, through the setting of sustainability 
standards, labelling and third-party verification, VSS 
are used by the private sector as part of its response 
to the challenges addressed in the SDGs. However, 
the contribution of VSS towards efforts for achieving 
the SDGs will depend on their effectiveness. Their 
effectiveness can be defined based on multiple 
dimensions (Marx et al., 2012) of which at least two 
are relevant for assessing their potential to contribute 
to the SDGs. The first dimension focuses on the 
impact of VSS on a range of social, economic and 
environmental indicators, such as improvements in 
biodiversity and in the wages and safety of workers, 
as well as greater integration into global value 
chains. Impact is achieved through different process 
and production methods.9 The second dimension 
8  For a more detailed discussion of the linkages between 
VSS and SDGs, see UNFSS (2018). 
9 For relevant studies on impacts of VSS, see Tayleur et 
al. (2017); Tayleur et al. (2018); Akoyi and Maertens (2018); 
Oya et al. (2018); Beghin et al. (2015); Loconto and Dankers 
(2014); and ITC (2011a; 2011b); . For a good overview of 
existing studies, see also https://www.evidensia.eco/
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analyses the degree to which VSS are adopted by 
economic operators. These two dimensions of 
effectiveness are interrelated: a VSS that generates 
significant impacts on the ground and transforms the 
way producers work but which is not widely adopted 
will not result in a large-scale transformation towards 
sustainability.
Hence, scaling up and providing incentives for 
increased adoption of VSS are crucial. In this regard, 
governments can potentially play an important 
role.10 More specifically, incorporating VSS in public 
procurement and trade policies can significantly 
contribute to upscaling the use of VSS, thereby 
improving their effectiveness to some extent. 
Indeed, both policy areas, in essence, endeavour 
to govern (global) value chains according to a set of 
sustainability principles and standards.11 Sustainable 
public procurement (SPP) seeks to ensure that 
governments consider the sustainability of the 
products they purchase. The inclusion of VSS in public 
procurement is therefore a potentially powerful tool to 
upscale their adoption, given that such procurement 
accounts for 13 per cent of GDP in OECD countries, 
on average, and it is even higher in some developing 
countries. Similarly, as increased trade leads to 
greater sustainability challenges, the inclusion of 
instruments, such as VSS, that aim to entrench more 
sustainable practices in global trade can contribute 
to incorporating sustainability considerations in 
trade policy. In this respect, through a series of trade 
instruments, governments can include sustainability 
considerations in their trade policy and can use VSS, 
among other instruments, to implement them. There 
are other ways to upscale VSS adoption, for example 
through consumer or business demand – an area that 
could be discussed in a future UNFSS flagship report. 
The present report explores the role of governments 
in scaling up VSS adoption or “uptake” (terms that are 
used interchangeably in this report), with a specific 
focus on public procurement and trade policy. 
10  On public-private interactions, see Lambin et al. (2018); 
Lambin and Thorlakson (2018); and Eberlein et al. (2014).
11  The current report builds on the previous flagship report 
which examined the interlinkages between VSS and trade 
(UNFSS, 2018).
WHY INTEGRATE VSS INTO 
PUBLIC POLICIES?
Three distinct steps can be distinguished in the 
way VSS work, which also highlight the relevance 
of VSS to public policies (figure 1). First, the sets of 
rules and standards in most of the well-known VSS 
schemes today integrate existing international law 
and commitments, often developed in a multilateral 
context, based on international conventions. As such, 
they include public rules and standards in a private 
set of procedures. Thus, VSS are connected with 
public policies by virtue of their embeddedness in 
public international law; they start off from the same 
normative basis, in that, to a degree, they refer to 
the same international agreements and conventions 
that underpin the notion of sustainable development. 
Indeed, Collins et al. (2017), who analysed 45 VSS, 
found that 78 per cent of them cited international 
laws or norms in their standards. Marx (2019a) found 
that many ISEAL members refer to international 
conventions in their standard-setting practices. 
Specifically, several of them refer to the following 
international conventions: Forced Labour Convention, 
1930 (No. 29), Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 
87), Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98), Convention concerning 
Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers 
for Work of Equal Value, 1951 (No. 100), Convention 
concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957 
(No. 105), Convention concerning Discrimination 
in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 1958 
(No. 111), Convention concerning Minimum Age 
for Admission to Employment, 1973 (No. 138), 
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour, 1999 (No. 182), Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(1973), Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) and 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (2001). Some VSS also refer to human rights 
conventions or other environmental agreements, such 
as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer (1987) and the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989). These 
conventions are sometimes also integrated into some 
public procurement and trade policies (discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3 of this report). Consequently, besides 
contributing to the SDGs, which is arguably the most 
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important global multilateral agenda, VSS also aim to 
enforce some specific multilateral commitments.
Second, and important in the context of integrating 
VSS into public policy, VSS translate these 
international principles and standards into measurable 
indicators and actions, which enables enforcement 
and compliance assessment. Often, VSS initiatives 
start with defining general principles, as noted earlier, 
and delegate the formulation of specific standards 
to working groups or committees that take local 
conditions into account. These general principles 
are then translated into specific “compliance 
benchmarks”. Those benchmarks contain more 
specific criteria that are related to each of the 
broad principles. Each of the benchmarks is in turn 
further defined and operationalized into measurable 
indicators.  
Third, after operationalizing international norms into 
specific standards, VSS establish systems to monitor 
compliance with standards by those adopting 
the VSS. Monitoring of compliance with VSS is a 
function of two interrelated components: top-down 
monitoring systems (often audit-based) and bottom-
up monitoring systems (often complaint-based) 
(Marx and Wouters, 2015). The former involve an 
assessment of conformity with standards and rules by 
independent third parties using a set of standardized 
procedures primarily based on audit procedures. 
Complaint systems allow external stakeholders to 
constantly monitor compliance with commitments, 
and, in case of non-compliance, to file a complaint. 
Stakeholders’ engagement in these complaint 
systems not only empowers them, by allowing them 
to raise issues relevant to the functioning of VSS; it 
is also essential for the proper functioning of VSS to 
monitor compliance, since insufficient stakeholder 
engagement may result in non-compliance going 
unnoticed. This third step – an elaborate set of 
enforcement procedures – is especially interesting 
from the perspective of SPP and trade policies, 
since it aims to ensure compliance with sustainability 
standards. VSS enforcement procedures can 
therefore foster stronger implementation of 
sustainability requirements embedded in SPP and 
trade policies. 
VSS therefore offer a potentially interesting 
complement to existing public policies, and for this 
reason they might merit further integration into such 
policies. This possible complementarity, as illustrated 
in figure 1, starts from the observation that VSS, to 
a degree, are based on an underlying conception of 
Figure 1
Links between VSS, procurement and trade policies
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Source: Authors of this report.
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sustainable development which is shared by several 
public policy approaches to sustainable development. 
The figure shows that VSS, SPP and trade policy 
refer to similar international conventions and try to 
operationalize these based on sustainability principles, 
standards and criteria, which can be considered 
as sustainability objectives. These sustainability 
objectives are pursued through different means. 
Existing procurement and trade policies aim to have 
producers comply with these principles, standards 
and criteria, just as VSS do. Therefore, to pursue 
their sustainability commitments, governments do 
not necessarily need to reinvent sustainability tools 
and measures. Rather, the integration of VSS into 
SPP and trade policy can serve as an additional, 
complementary enforcement infrastructure for 
governments to achieve their sustainability objectives 
in line with international law. 
In addition, the integration of VSS into public policies 
could potentially strengthen domestic institutions 
in least developed and middle-income countries, 
enabling them to pursue sustainable development 
objectives more effectively. There is some evidence 
that VSS could contribute to the strengthening of 
domestic legal frameworks and institutions, for 
example in relation to forest governance (see Basso 
et al. (2011) for Brazil, and Cerutti et al. (2011) for 
Cameroon). By scaling up the use of VSS, these 
interaction effects between VSS and domestic 
rules and institutions could be strengthened, in turn 
improving the capacity of governments to better 
achieve their sustainable development objectives.
AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF 
THE REPORT
This report analyses how VSS are (and can be) 
integrated into SPP and trade policy respectively, and 
explores some of the arguments for and against such 
integration. The aims of the report are to:
	 Initiate and stimulate informed debate about 
the integration of VSS in SPP and trade 
policy;
	Offer insights into strengths, weaknesses, 
possibilities and opportunities presented by 
the proposed approaches and options;
	 Identify some of the main implications of VSS 
integration into SPP and trade policy.
The report is structured as follows:
• Chapter 1 describes key trends in VSS adoption. 
After examining global trends in the number 
of VSS, the chapter explores the evolution of 
certified commodities and croplands. It then 
analyses country-level VSS adoption levels, 
testing them against several country-level 
parameters in order to identify those with the 
potential to influence VSS uptake. The chapter 
ends by exploring other factors conducive to 
VSS adoption, including demands of consumers, 
businesses and governments for VSS. 
• Chapter 2 explores the role of public 
procurement in increasing VSS uptake. It first 
describes the importance of public procurement 
and introduces the concept of SPP, looking at 
how different countries integrate sustainability 
considerations into their public procurement. 
It then explores how VSS feature in SPP. The 
chapter ends by presenting key measures that 
would promote the integration of VSS into SPP, 
including strengthening the design of VSS, 
increasing the availability of VSS and reducing 
certification costs.
• Chapter 3 analyses different trade policy 
instruments in which VSS already play a role or 
in which their role is under consideration. More 
specifically, it introduces free trade agreements, 
preferential trade agreements (GSP measures), 
market access regulations and export promotion 
measures, and explores the current (or potential) 
role of VSS in those instruments. 
• In Chapter 4, some key considerations for 
further integrating VSS in SPP and trade policy 
are discussed. These include capacity issues 
within VSS systems resulting from the possible 
increase in the number of VSS, the implications for 
recognition systems, the risk of over-certification, 
and possible distributional effects. 
• In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the Conclusions reflect on the relevance of 
instruments such as VSS to build more sustainable 
societies in which the health of humans as well 
as ecosystems is preserved. Lastly, the main 
findings of this report are highlighted.
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INTRODUCTION
International trade has experienced significant 
transformations over the last 50 years. Not only has 
its size increased almost 30 fold; it has also changed 
in nature, as value chains have spread around the 
globe and become more complex. The expansion 
and globalization of trade have had significant 
environmental impacts, such as deforestation, 
biodiversity loss, climate change, resource depletion, 
and water and air pollution. They have also led to 
increased risks of global health crises, such as the 
current COVID-19 pandemic. Governing global value 
chains in a sustainable manner has thus become 
a prominent issue, and VSS, among others, have 
emerged as leading governance instruments in that 
sense. 
Whether VSS are an efficient tool for promoting 
sustainability remains a much debated and 
researched question. Most of the literature on the 
effectiveness of sustainability standards concentrates 
on the degree to which those standards contribute to 
poverty alleviation, environmental protection and other 
sustainability metrics. However, the effectiveness 
of VSS is also determined by the degree to which 
they are adopted. It has been observed that, over 
the past two decades, the adoption of sustainability 
standards has grown gradually, and in some cases 
exponentially. Yet the adoption dynamics of VSS have 
received little attention.
Adoption of VSS refers to the degree of uptake of 
VSS schemes by producers or firms along global 
value chains. This can be measured by different 
indicators, such as the total number of VSS schemes 
that are active globally or in selected countries, the 
number of producers or firms that are certified, the 
number of certified hectares of production land, and 
the proportion of certified products per commodity. 
Analysing the adoption dynamics of VSS, or the 
evolution of VSS adoption over time, is essential for 
evaluating the effectiveness of VSS and for identifying 
the determinants of adoption with a view to increasing 
VSS uptake as a means to achieving increased 
sustainability.
This chapter examines the adoption dynamics of 
VSS from three perspectives: global trends in VSS 
adoption, the evolution of certified commodities, 
and VSS uptake at country-level. The latter is then 
tested against several parameters in order to identify 
potential determinants of VSS adoption. The Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), a leading sustainability 
standard for forest governance, is analysed as a case 
study to understand VSS adoption dynamics. The 
chapter concludes by exploring different explanations 
and hypothesizing on what factors influence adoption. 
CHAPTER 1
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GLOBAL TRENDS IN VSS 
ADOPTION
Adoption dynamics of VSS schemes can first be 
analysed by examining the evolution of their total 
number globally between 1940 and 2020 (figure 2). 
Two VSS databases – the ITC Standards Map and 
the Ecolabel Index of the European Union – were 
used, which map out all existing VSS schemes and 
compile data on their requirements and procedures. 
The figure is based on the reported establishment 
date of VSS schemes, and only includes those that 
were still in existence at the time of making the graph 
(March 2020). Therefore, the figure does not reflect 
the dynamics of establishment and failures of VSS, as 
analysed by Bloomfield and Schleifer (2017).
Figure 2 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ITC Standards Map12 
and Ecolabel Index.13
Despite the divergence in numbers between the 
ITC Standards Map and the Ecolabel Index,14 two 




13  Ecolabel Index (n.d.). Ecolabel Index. Available at: http://
www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/ (accessed, March 
2020).
14  This divergence is explained by different methodologies 
in the construction of the databases. The ITC Standards 
Map is typically more restrictive, as it relies on data quality 
review from independent experts as well as from standards 
organizations themselves. The Ecolabel Index is more 
comprehensive, as it aims to map out all existing VSS 
interesting trends can be discerned. First, although 
the idea of voluntary standards is quite old (Marx and 
Wouters, 2015), their proliferation is more recent: VSS 
truly emerged in the 1990s, and their number grew 
consistently until the early 2010s. Second, growth in 
the number of active VSS has been slowing down 
in recent years, and has even stagnated since 2017, 
though it is unclear why this has happened. It may 
be that the market for VSS is saturating in some 
sectors, in other words, that the existing VSS cover 
a broad range of social, economic and environmental 
issues, so that there is little scope for additional VSS 
to emerge – in some specific sectors at least (see 
also figure 3 in next section). Another reason for the 
recent stagnation in the number of VSS may lie in 
their consolidation, through mergers, alliances and 
mutual recognition. Mergers of VSS have increasingly 
occurred, such as the UTZ and Rainforest Alliance 
merger in 2018. A third reason might simply be that, 
annually, the number of VSS that disappear due to 
low uptake levels or unsustainable economic models 
offsets the number of new VSS, thus showing an 
overall stagnation.
However, the recent stagnation in the number of 
existing VSS schemes does not signify stagnation 
in their adoption by producers or firms along global 
value chains within different sectors. This aspect is 
considered in the next section, which examines the 
evolution of certified cropland area and commodities 
as indicators of VSS adoption dynamics. 
EVOLUTION OF CERTIFIED 
COMMODITIES AND 
CROPLAND AREA 
While the number of VSS has grown globally since 
the 1990s, certain products or sectors are more 
intensively certified than others. This section looks 
at the distribution of VSS across sectors as well as, 
more significantly, the share of certified commodities 
in their respective markets and the total production 
area certified. 
The largest number of VSS can be found in the 
agricultural sector (figure 3), a trend that can be 
observed in the existing literature on VSS, which 
finds a significant focus on certification of agricultural 
schemes without review requirements. Hereinafter, data 
from the ITC Standards Map is used.
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commodities. However, a large number of VSS in a 
given sector does not necessarily imply a high level of 
certification in that sector. One could even question 
whether the presence of numerous VSS in a given 
sector is desirable, as it can confuse consumers 
seeking to identify credible VSS. In order to better 
capture VSS uptake, it is preferable to examine the 
share of certified commodities in total commodity 
production and the percentage of certified production 
area in total production area.
Figure 3










































































































Source: Authors’ calculation based on ITC Standards Map.15
In this respect, the State of Sustainable Markets 
annual reports of the ITC, in collaboration with the 
Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL) and 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD), have been providing the most comprehensive 
mapping and evolution of certified commodities 
globally since 2008. Those reports compile data from 




the 14 major VSS organizations16 globally, covering 8 
agricultural commodities – bananas, cocoa, coffee, 
cotton, palm oil, soybeans, sugarcane and tea – 
plus forestry. The main findings of the 2019 report 
show that certification has intensified over the past 
decade, in terms of both the proportion of certified 
commodities in their respective markets and the 
proportion of certified production area (table 1). 
VSS are therefore no longer a niche market but are 
mainstreaming. In addition, the report estimates that 
the area of production land certified by the 12 leading 
agricultural VSS under study accounts for only 1.94 
per cent of total agricultural land area globally (Willer 
et al., 2019: 7), but that this percentage is increasing. 
This increase is confirmed by Tayleur et al. (2017), who 
mapped out the coverage of 12 major agricultural 
VSS,17 and found that certified cropland is growing by 
approximately 11 per cent a year. However, similar to 
the findings of the State of Sustainable Markets 2019 
report, the authors also show that only 1.1 per cent 
of global cropland is certified by those 12 major VSS. 
One of the reasons for this low proportion is probably 
because demand for certification has originated 
16 The 14 VSS organizations are: 4C Services (4C), 
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), Bonsucro, Cotton made in 
Africa (CmiA), Fairtrade International (Fairtrade), Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), GLOBALG.A.P., IFOAM 
– Organics International (organic), Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), ProTerra 
Foundation (ProTerra), Rainforest Alliance (Rainforest), 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), Round Table 
on Responsible Soy (RTRS) and UTZ (a programme and 
certification scheme for sustainable farming).
17 Namely: 4C Services (4C), Better Cotton Initiative 
(BCI), Bonsucro, Cotton made in Africa (CmiA), Fairtrade 
International (Fairtrade), GLOBALG.A.P., IFOAM – Organics 
International (organic), ProTerra Foundation (ProTerra), 
Rainforest Alliance (Rainforest), Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO), Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS), 
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mostly in developed countries, with a recent focus 
on tropical agricultural commodities, and therefore 
there are fewer incentives for farmers in developing 
countries to adopt certification for domestic crops. 
While the proportion of land under certified production 
globally remains limited, it is nonetheless growing, 
and certified products are gaining market shares 
as well. However, this trend is not uniform across all 
countries. Tayleur et al. (2017) analysed the proportion 
of land under certified production by country. They 
showed that certification is more intensive in some 
countries than in others. Countries scoring high 
(> 10 per cent of production land certified) include 
Austria, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, 
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Italy, Malaysia, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Sierra Leone, Sweden and 
Zambia. Other countries, such as Brazil, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mexico, Nicaragua and Spain also score 
relatively high (> 5 per cent). Such findings seem rather 
intuitive. Considering that about 60 per cent of all VSS 
apply to agricultural products, one might assume 
that the largest producing countries of agricultural 
commodities are likely to be more intensively certified. 
Nonetheless, another study by Tayleur et al. (2018) 
showed that within the areas or countries where 
agricultural commodities are mostly produced, 
certification is not uniformly distributed. For example, 
while bananas, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soybeans 
and sugarcane are produced in many tropical 
countries, certified commodities are concentrated 
in specific countries or regions of countries. For 
bananas, certification is most intensive in some parts 
of Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador and Honduras. Certified cocoa is mostly 
concentrated in Côte d’Ivoire, certified coffee in 
Brazil, Central America and Colombia, certified palm 
oil in Indonesia and Malaysia, certified soybeans in 
Argentina and Brazil, and certified sugarcane in Brazil. 
These findings suggest that being a large producer 
of intensively certified commodities potentially plays 
a role, but this does not adequately explain VSS 
uptake. One can hypothesize that other country-level 
parameters are also influencing the adoption of VSS. 
The next section analyses the degree of VSS adoption 
per country, and explores possible explanatory 
factors for variations in uptake. 
UPTAKE OF VSS AT COUNTRY 
LEVEL
Country-level data, while not a perfect measure, is 
a relevant proxy for analysing VSS adoption, since 
it gives some insight into where VSS are active, and 
potentially enables an identification of some country-
level parameters that influence VSS adoption.
Table 1
Evolution of certification in selected agricultural commodities and forestry
Commodity
Share of certified 
production volume 
in total production, 
2017
Growth in share of 
certified production 
volume in total 
production, 2013-2017
Share of certified 
production land in 
total production land, 
2017
Growth in share of 
certified production 
land in total production 
land, 2013-2017
(Per cent) (Per cent) (Per cent) (Per cent)
Bananas 5.6 +88.7 6.0 +28.6
Cocoa 29.4 +58.2 24.8 +114.7
Coffee 26.1 -7.8 23.4 +8.7
Cotton NA NA 16.2 +172.4
Palm oil NA NA 11.9 +26.1
Soybeans 1.5 +34.3 1.5 -5.9
Sugarcane NA NA 7.6 +80.2
Tea 20.9 +71.0 16.4 +77.3
Forestry NA NA 10.8 +27.9 a
Source: Willer et al. (2019). 
a For wood, the reference period is 2010–2017.
NA= data not available.
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Based on data from the ITC Standards Map, the 
degree of VSS adoption of a selected country is 
measured as the percentage of active VSS in that 
country in relation to the total number of active VSS 
worldwide. The theoretical maximum for such a score 
is 100, corresponding to a country where all existing 
VSS are active. However, such a score is not expected 
to be found, as a significant number of VSS are local 
and sector-specific. It is therefore not possible for a 
country to have all existing VSS active on its territory. 
The theoretical minimum for the adoption score is 
0, corresponding to a country that does not have 
any active VSS. Adoption scores are then tested 
against several country-level trade, governance, 
development and globalization parameters in order 
to identify factors that influence VSS uptake. Table 
2 ranks countries according to their VSS adoption 
score, showing also their income level. A map (figure 
4) provides a visual representation of this table. 
Five observations can be made from table 2. First, it 
appears that VSS are found in all countries,18 but that 
there is considerable variation between countries, 
which can be expected on the basis of the size of 
the economy. Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico 
the United States, for example, are leading in VSS 
adoption, with more than 40 per cent of all existing 
VSS active in their respective territories. At the other 
end of the table, New Caledonia, Micronesia, Palau, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Nauru are lagging behind, with 
less than 10 per cent of all VSS being active in their 
territories. However, countries at the lower end of 
the table are mostly small island developing States, 
where lower adoption scores are to be expected, as 
smaller economies provide fewer opportunities for 
different VSS to operate. 
Second, variation in adoption scores appears to more 
or less align with income levels. Indeed, low-income 
countries – and, to some extent, lower-middle-
income countries – feature low in the table, meaning 
that low-income countries tend to count fewer VSS 
than high- or upper- middle-income countries. The 
United Republic of Tanzania is the best-scoring low-
income country, ranking 36th, with 29 per cent of all 
VSS being active on its territory. Reciprocally, among 
the 30 best scoring countries, only 4 are from the low- 
18 The ITC Standards Map does not provide data for 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and South Sudan. 
While those countries do, nonetheless, count a few VSS 
active on their territory, they are excluded from our analysis. 
or lower- middle-income groups. Large countries with 
well-developed economies tend to have more VSS. 
Nonetheless, and as a third observation, variation in 
adoption scores does not always align with income 
level. Japan, for example, despite being the third 
largest economy in the world, only ranks 35th in the 
VSS adoption score, after Honduras and Sri Lanka. 
The Russian Federation, as the 12th largest economy 
in the world, ranks only 62nd. The size or income level 
of an economy is therefore not the only determinant of 
the extent of VSS adoption within a country. 
More so, and fourth, some lower-middle-income 
countries score high, such as Viet Nam (10th position), 
Indonesia (5th position) and India (4th position). Income 
level therefore does not necessarily predict the VSS 
adoption ranking. Rather, the well-scoring lower-
middle-income countries are typically countries that 
pursue an export-oriented industrialization policy. 
Lastly, even some low-income countries score fairly 
high, such as the United Republic of Tanzania, as 
aforementioned, and Ethiopia (37th) – just below 
Japan and above Sweden. It is worth noting that 
these low-income countries that score relatively high 
export commodities, such as coffee, which can be 
certified by multiple certificates. 
In order to explore possible determinants of country-
level VSS uptake, adoption scores are tested against 
a number of economic and political indicators (table 
3).19 Correlation coefficients (r) are calculated to 
identify factors that correlate with VSS adoption at 
country level, with correlation considered high when 
r is higher than 0.5 (|r| > .5), moderate when r ranges 
between 0.3 and 0.5 (.3 < |r| < .5), and weak when 
r is below 0.3 (|r| < .3). This correlational analysis is 
used only for exploratory purposes, and does not aim 
to identify the exact determinants of VSS presence 
in each country. Rather it is intended to provide a 
general understanding of some factors potentially at 
play.20 
19 Adoption scores are correlated with income level and 
several trade, governance, development and globalization 
indicators by analysing correlation (r). See annex for 
explanatory notes to this table.
20 For further analysis, this modelling exercise could be 
complemented with ground level research. 
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Table 2
Degree of VSS adoption by country, with income level
Rank Country VSS adoption score Income group 
1 Brazil 45.77 Upper middle
2 United States of America 43.85 High
3 China 43.08 Upper middle
4 India 43.08 Lower middle
5 Indonesia 41.92 Lower middle
6 Mexico 41.15 Upper middle
7 Peru 39.23 Upper middle
8 Germany 38.85 High
9 Colombia 38.08 Upper middle
10 Viet Nam 38.08 Lower middle
11 Thailand 37.31 Upper middle
12 Netherlands 36.92 High
13 United Kingdom 36.54 High
14 Spain 35.77 High
15 Turkey 35.38 Upper middle
16 France 35.00 High
17 Italy 35.00 High
18 South Africa 34.62 Upper middle
19 Canada 34.23 High
20 Argentina 33.85 Upper middle
21 Belgium 33.85 High
22 Costa Rica 33.08 Upper middle
23 Chile 31.92 High
24 Ecuador 31.92 Upper middle
25 Switzerland 31.92 High
26 Kenya 31.54 Lower middle
27 Portugal 31.54 High
28 Austria 31.15 High
29 Denmark 31.15 High
30 Malaysia 31.15 Upper middle
31 Australia 30.77 High
32 Poland 30.00 High
33 Honduras 29.62 Lower middle
34 Sri Lanka 29.62 Upper middle
35 Japan 29.23 High
36 United Republic of Tanzania 29.23 Low
37 Ethiopia 28.85 Low
38 Guatemala 28.85 Upper middle
39 Sweden 28.85 High
40 Egypt 28.08 Lower middle
41 Greece 28.08 High
.../...
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Rank Country VSS adoption score Income group 
42 Ireland 28.08 High
43 Nicaragua 28.08 Lower middle
44 Philippines 27.69 Lower middle
45 Bulgaria 27.31 Upper middle
46 Czech Republic 26.92 High
47 Dominican Republic 26.92 Upper middle
48 Hungary 26.92 High
49 Morocco 26.92 Lower middle
50 Ghana 26.54 Lower middle
51 Pakistan 26.54 Lower middle
52 Romania 26.54 Upper middle
53 Uganda 26.15 Low
54 Bolivia 25.77 Lower middle
55 Finland 25.77 High
56 Madagascar 25.77 Low
57 Norway 25.77 High
58 Tunisia 25.77 Lower middle
59 Cambodia 25.38 Lower middle
60 Croatia 25.38 High
61 Paraguay 25.00 Upper middle
62 Russian Federation 24.62 Upper middle
63 New Zealand 24.23 High
64 Uruguay 23.85 High
65 Lithuania 23.46 High
66 Slovakia 23.46 High
67 Bangladesh 23.08 Lower middle
68 El Salvador 23.08 Lower middle
69 Mauritius 23.08 Upper middle
70 Republic of Korea 23.08 High
71 Slovenia 23.08 High
72 Singapore 22.69 High
73 Zambia 22.69 Lower middle
74 Côte d’Ivoire 22.31 Lower middle
75 Latvia 21.92 High
76 Zimbabwe 21.92 Lower middle
77 Estonia 21.15 High
78 Panama 21.15 High
79 Serbia and Montenegro 21.15 Upper middle
80 Israel 20.77 High
81 Ukraine 20.77 Lower middle
82 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20.38 Upper middle
83 Malawi 20.38 Low
84 Burkina Faso 20.00 Low
85 Cameroon 20.00 Lower middle
.../...
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Rank Country VSS adoption score Income group 
86 Papua New Guinea 20.00 Lower middle
87 Cyprus 19.62 High
88 Rwanda 19.62 Low
89 Senegal 19.62 Lower middle
90 United Arab Emirates 19.62 High
91 Democratic Republic of the Congo 19.23 Low
92 Luxembourg 19.23 High
93 Nepal 19.23 Low
94 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 18.85 Lower middle
95 Mozambique 18.85 Low
96 Belize 18.46 Upper middle
97 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 18.46 Upper middle
98 Myanmar 18.08 Lower middle
99 Nigeria 18.08 Lower middle
100 Suriname 18.08 Upper middle
101 Jordan 17.69 Upper middle
102 Mali 17.69 Low
103 Burundi 17.31 Low
104 Lebanon 17.31 Upper middle
105 Malta 17.31 High
106 North Macedonia 17.31 Upper middle
107 Congo 16.92 Lower middle
108 Haiti 16.92 Low
109 Togo 16.92 Low
110 Namibia 16.54 Upper middle
111 Oman 16.54 High
112 Albania 15.77 Upper middle
113 Jamaica 15.77 Upper middle
114 State of Palestine 15.77 Lower middle
115 Saudi Arabia 15.77 High
116 Algeria 15.38 Upper middle
117 Guyana 15.38 Upper middle
118 Kazakhstan 15.38 Upper middle
119 Republic of Moldova 15.38 Lower middle
120 Eswatini 15.38 Lower middle
121 Benin 15.00 Low
122 Botswana 15.00 Upper middle
123 Fiji 15.00 Upper middle
124 Georgia 15.00 Upper middle
125 Iceland 15.00 High
126 Mongolia 15.00 Lower middle
127 Trinidad and Tobago 15.00 High
128 Bahamas 14.62 High
129 Bahrain 14.62 High
.../...
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Rank Country VSS adoption score Income group 
130 Maldives 14.62 Upper middle
131 Niger 14.62 Low
132 Sierra Leone 14.62 Low
133 Uzbekistan 14.62 Lower middle
134 Azerbaijan 14.23 Upper middle
135 Gambia 14.23 Low
136 Angola 13.85 Lower middle
137 Cuba 13.85 Upper middle
138 Gabon 13.85 Upper middle
139 Guinea 13.85 Low
140 Liberia 13.85 Low
141 Seychelles 13.85 High
142 Turkmenistan 13.85 Upper middle
143 Barbados 13.46 High
144 Belarus 13.46 Upper middle
145 Saint Lucia 13.46 Upper middle
146 Syrian Arab Republic 13.46 Low
147 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 13.08 Low
148 Grenada 13.08 Upper middle
149 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 13.08 Upper middle
150 Lesotho 13.08 Lower middle
151 Sudan 13.08 Lower middle
152 Tajikistan 13.08 Low
153 Armenia 12.69 Upper middle
154 Cabo Verde 12.69 Lower middle
155 Kuwait 12.69 High
156 Kyrgyzstan 12.69 Lower middle
157 Mauritania 12.69 Lower middle
158 Afghanistan 12.31 Low 
159 Antigua and Barbuda 12.31 High
160 Central African Republic 12.31 Low
161 Dominica 12.31 Upper middle
162 French Guiana 12.31
163 Guinea-Bissau 12.31 Low
164 Qatar 12.31 High
165 Solomon Islands 12.31 Lower middle
166 Timor-Leste 12.31 Lower middle
167 Chad 11.92 Low
168 Comoros 11.92 Lower middle
169 Eritrea 11.92 Low
170 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 11.92
171 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 11.92 Upper middle
172 Yemen 11.92 Low
173 Djibouti 11.54 Lower middle
.../...
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ITC Standards Map.21
Figure 4
VSS adoption intensity map per country (as a percentage of all VSS)
Source: Authors’ map based on ITC Standards Map.22 
21  ITC (n.d.). ITC Standards Map. Available at: https://sustainabilitymap.org/standards?q=eyJzZWxlY3RlZENsaWVudCI6Ik-
5PIEFGRklMSUFUSU9OIn0%3D (accessed, March 2020).
22  ITC (n.d.). ITC Standards Map. Available at: https://sustainabilitymap.org/standards?q=eyJzZWxlY3RlZENsaWVudCI6Ik-
5PIEFGRklMSUFUSU9OIn0%3D (accessed, March 2020).
Rank Country VSS adoption score Income group 
174 Equatorial Guinea 11.54 Upper middle
175 Iraq 11.54 Upper middle
176 Libya 11.54 Upper middle
177 Sao Tome and Principe 11.54 Lower middle
178 Somalia 11.54 Low
179 Saint Kitts and Nevis 11.54 High
180 Bhutan 11.15 Lower middle
181 Brunei Darussalam 11.15 High
182 Samoa 10.77 Upper middle
183 Vanuatu 10.77 Lower middle
184 Andorra 10.38 High
185 Kiribati 10.38 Lower middle
186 Marshall Islands 10.00 Upper middle
187 New Caledonia 9.62 High
188 Micronesia (Federated States of) 9.23 Lower middle
189 Palau 9.23 High
190 Tonga 9.23 Upper middle
191 Tuvalu 9.23 Upper middle
192 Nauru 8.46 Upper middle
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTADstat23; UN 
Comtrade24; World Bank25; WEF (2019); Heritage Foundation 
(2019); KOF26; UNDP27.
Table 3 shows that 4 out of 18 indicators analysed are 
strongly correlated with VSS adoption level (|r| > .5), 
namely overall globalization, export concentration, 
net imports and net exports. This corresponds to 
23  UNCTADstat (n.d.). Merchandise: Product concentration 
and diversification indices of exports and imports, 
annual. Available at: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/
TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=120 (accessed, 
March 2020).
24  UN Comtrade (n.d.). International Trade Statistics – 
Import/Export Data. Available at: https://comtrade.un.org/
data/ (accessed, March 2020).
25  World Bank (n.d.a.). World Bank Open Data. Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed, March 2020); World 
Bank (n.d.b.). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Available 
at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-
governance-indicators (accessed, March 2020).
26 KOF (n.d.). KOF Globalisation Index. Available at: https://
kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-
globalisation-index.html (accessed, March 2020).
27 UNDP (n.d.). Human Development Data (1990-2018). 
Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data (accessed, March 
2020).
findings by Tayleur et al. (2017) who observed that 
the most intensively certified commodities are also 
the most exported ones. Moderately correlated to 
VSS adoption level (.3 < |r| < .5) are the following 
indicators: doing business, global competitiveness, 
GDP, governance (i.e. government effectiveness and 
rule of law), trade freedom, population size and the 
Human Development Index. 
Trade diversification is an important correlate of VSS 
adoption. As an illustration, figure 5 shows the relation 
between the Export Concentration index (x-axis) and 
VSS adoption scores (y-axis), which are normalized 
on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 being a country with no 
VSS, and 1 being the best scoring country (Brazil). 
The red line represents the correlation between both 
variables. The figure shows that countries scoring 
rather well on VSS adoption (y-axis) have a smaller 
export concentration index (x-axis), meaning that their 
exports are more diversified, with a broader range of 
products. By contrast, countries that score high on 
export concentration, in other words, whose exports 
are concentrated in a few products, score relatively 
low on VSS adoption. This result is rather intuitive, as 
Table 3 
Correlation coefficients between indicators and countries’ VSS adoption scores
Indicator r Correlation type
Overall Globalisation index 0.5955
High
Export Concentration index -0.5607
Net imports 0.5340
Net exports 0.5198
Doing Business index 0.4901
Moderate





Human Development Index 0.3794
Rule of law 0.3339
GDP per capita 0.2772
Weak
Income group 0.2494
Share of agriculture in GDP -0.2339
Trade tariffs -0.1879
Exports as a share of GDP -0.0099
Growth rate of GDP per capita, 1995-2019 0.0023
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countries with more diversified export products have 
the potential to adopt more VSS, as individual VSS 
are most often targeted towards a certain range of 
products. Conversely, countries whose exports are 
limited to a few products have less potential to adopt 
several VSS. 
Figure 5
Correlation between countries’ export concentration 





























Source: Authors’ calculations based on ITC Standards Map28 
and UNCTADstat.29
Besides trade diversification, VSS adoption is 
assumed to be influenced by a combination of other 
political and economic factors (see annex). Given 
that most r scores calculated in table 3 indicate 
high or moderate correlations, as a general rule it 
could be asserted that open economies (measured 
by the overall Globalization index, Doing Business 
index, Global Competitiveness index, and trade 
freedom) with diversified economic sectors and 
exports (measured by export diversification and 
concentration indices and net imports and exports), 
relatively well-functioning governments (measured 
by government effectiveness and rule of law) and a 




29 UNCTADstat (n.d.). Merchandise: Product concentration 
and diversification indices of exports and imports, 
annual. Available at: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/
TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=120 (accessed, 
March 2020).
certain level of development (measured by GDP, the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and income group) 
tend to adopt more VSS. 
While this section explores countries’ VSS adoption 
scores against several indicators, measuring the 
number of VSS active in a country fails to provide 
information about the adoption dynamics of VSS in 
a given country; in other words, the evolution of VSS 
uptake over time. Aggregating adoption data for all 
VSS in each country over time is, however, beyond 
the scope of this report. Nonetheless, analysing 
individual VSS can provide meaningful insights into 
adoption dynamics of VSS, as illustrated in box 
1, which examines adoption dynamics in forest 
certification.
OTHER FACTORS 
INFLUENCING VSS ADOPTION  
In the previous section, several country-specific 
parameters that influence VSS adoption were 
identified. In this section, other factors including 
market-related ones, are explored to explain variations 
in VSS adoption. 
A major factor potentially explaining the general 
increase in VSS adoption is the existence of a 
consumer market for certified products. O’Rourke 
(2012), for instance, found that there is indeed a 
consumer demand for certified products, although the 
size of such a market remains unclear. However, other 
studies (Backhaus et al., 2012; EEA, 2015; Rokka and 
Uusitalo, 2008) show that in Europe, consumption 
patterns have remained relatively unchanged with 
regard to VSS. Other research points to an attitude-
behaviour gap of consumers, which suggests 
that their increased environmental awareness and 
their expressed willingness to pay higher prices 
for sustainable products do not translate into more 
sustainable consumption behaviours (Brenton, 2013; 
Rex and Baumann, 2007). Rather, it was found that 
demand for VSS at the level of individual consumers 
depends on multiple factors, including age, nationality, 
motivation, past experience with VSS, scepticism 
towards VSS agencies, level of expertise or knowledge 
about VSS, need, accessibility, affordability, product 
performance, or force of habit (Taufique et al., 2017; 
Thøgersen et al., 2009). While some research shows 
that tailored information tools can influence consumer 
behaviour towards more sustainable consumption 
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The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) are the 
two leading VSS in forestry at the global level. The FSC, aims to make forest management environmentally responsible, 
socially beneficial and economically viable in the long term. It was founded in 1993 by several environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), including the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the National Wildlife Federation 
and Friends of the Earth, along with profit-making firms such as Home Depot, B&Q and IKEA. The FSC is considered 
by many scholars as one of the most advanced examples of VSS due to its scope and multi-stakeholder internal 
structure (Bell and Hindmoor, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2004; Schepers, 2010). Indeed, the FSC certifies forests across 
80 countries, and has experienced a tenfold increase in adoption between 2001 and 2019, from approximately 20 
million hectares of forest certified in 2001 to more than 200 million in 2019 globally.a The PEFC was founded in 1999 
by industry groups backed by State agencies as a competitor to the FSC. The PEFC operates in 53 countries and 
certifies 325 million hectares of forest – a 50 per cent increase compared to 2008. Both the FSC and the PEFC have 
thus experienced significant growth in the areas they certify globally. But such growth is not homogeneous across all 
countries where the two VSS are active.
Based on a newly created dataset, Marx and Depoorter (forthcoming) studied the dynamics of adoption of FSC 
certification in all countries where it is active over the period 2001–2019, by analysing the evolution of both the absolute 
number of hectares certified and the proportion of certified forest as a percentage of total forest cover per country 
per year. As the total number of existing VSS has been growing since the 1990s, and as certification of cropland and 
commodities continues to increase annually, one might expect VSS adoption to experience similar growth. 
However, the authors identified six different types of adoption dynamics for the FSC. The first and most widespread 
is the steadily growing type. In around half of the countries where the FSC is active, adoption increased constantly 
between 2001 and 2019, although the level of adoption varied across countries, from less than 1 per cent of total 
forest cover certified, such as in Argentina and Colombia, to nearly 100 per cent, as in Belarus. This type of adoption 
dynamic is what one would expect from the trends in VSS observed at the global level. In other countries, adoption 
of FSC certification has also been increasing but with sudden growth rather than steadily This constitutes the second 
type of adoption dynamic, and concerns 14 countries, including Spain, Croatia, Estonia and Denmark. In this case 
too, the scale of adoption dynamic has varied. However, the FSC has also experienced a stagnation, and even a 
decline, of adoption in 14 other countries. The third category, the stagnating type, has been observed in countries 
such as Mozambique, Nicaragua, Gabon, Ireland and Latvia. In some countries, such as Costa Rica, adoption of 
FSC certification has experienced a steady decline – the fourth category; whereas in other countries, such as Austria 
and Cambodia, there has been a sharp decline, which is the fifth type of adoption dynamic. The last category, the 
fluctuating type, observed in 17 countries, including Brazil, China France and Zimbabwe, is characterized by multiple 
variations in adoption, with no clear trend.
The researchers presented two findings: first, there are different types of adoption dynamics across countries; second, 
linear or exponential growth in adoption of FSC certification cannot be assumed. Adoption depends on country-level 
economic, social, political and environmental parameters. Additionally, adoption dynamics of FSC certification are 
determined by the number and size of forest owners that become certified, are certified and drop out of certification 
each year. They also analysed the adoption dynamics of the PEFC based on the same methodology for the period 
2008–2019 (no data were available for the period prior to 2008). They found the same six types of dynamics across 
countries. However, interestingly, their data revealed that in some cases, for a given country where both the FSC and 
the PEFC are active, the two VSS experience different types of adoption dynamics.
a FSC (n.d.). Facts and Figures. Available at: https://fsc.org/en/page/facts-figures (accessed, March 2020).
Box 1. Adoption dynamics in forest certification
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(UNEP, 2020), whether the behavioural change is 
significant enough to upscale VSS adoption at the 
producer or firm level remains debatable.
In this sense, a second factor that can foster adoption 
of VSS is business demand. Several scholars, such 
as Galati et al. (2017) have explored the reasons 
why companies wish to take up VSS. First, they find 
that, in their desire to meet the growing consumer 
demand for sustainable products, businesses 
increasingly use VSS as a signalling mechanism to 
inform consumers about the sustainability of their 
products, and as a differentiation mechanism to gain 
market shares. Second, companies adopt VSS as a 
means to mitigate reputational risks. Indeed, starting 
in the 1970s, NGOs have gained power and have 
been conducting naming-and-shaming campaigns 
against companies whose activities have adverse 
socioeconomic or environmental impacts. To avoid 
being the target of such campaigns and to preserve 
their reputation, businesses therefore adopt VSS as 
proof of compliance with sustainability standards. 
Third, VSS are used by companies as a way to 
govern their supply chains at a time of increased 
due diligence requirements. With the advent of SPP 
in particular (chapter 2), supplier firms may seek to 
adopt VSS as a competitive advantage for winning 
public contracts. In addition, investment banks and 
private investors are also increasingly seeking to 
acquire sustainable portfolios, and VSS can serve 
as proof of compliance with sustainable practices 
and standards. Fourth, government regulations 
on reporting business practices are increasing. In 
this case as well, taking up VSS can serve as proof 
of compliance with sustainability standards and 
facilitate the transfer of such information, provided 
that governments accept VSS as sufficient proof. 
Lastly, VSS adoption can increase, depending on the 
structure of the business sector: VSS spread more 
rapidly in sectors with large and vertically integrated 
companies (Espach, 2006; Gulbrandsen, 2005; 
Swinnen et al., 2015; ITC, 2011a), as adoption of VSS 
in one stage of the value chain spreads more easily 
to the other stages. More specifically, the increasing 
concentration and bargaining power of retailers on 
world markets might increase VSS adoption at the 
global level.
Government drivers constitute a third factor that can 
explain an increase in VSS uptake through three 
mechanisms. First, governments can include private 
governance systems in public legislation. Some 
examples are provided in chapter 3 of this report. 
Second, an increasing number of laws and regulations 
are requiring the disclosure of non-financial information 
about supply chains, such as the California Act on 
Transparency or the EU Directive 2014/95/EU on non-
financial reporting, the UK Modern Slavery Act, Dutch 
Child Labour Due Diligence Act and French Duty of 
Vigilance Law. VSS can serve as proof of assurance 
that supply chains are being monitored and governed, 
which can therefore lead to further adoption of VSS. 
Third, as mentioned previously, sustainable public 
procurement policies can also increase VSS adoption. 
Public procurement can account for between 10 
and 25 per cent of GDP depending on the country. 
Public contracts that stipulate environmental and 
social conditions and acknowledge VSS as proof of 
compliance can therefore encourage suppliers to 
adopt VSS. The next chapter further elaborates on 
the role of VSS in SPP.
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CHAPTER 2
DRIVERS FOR ADOPTION: SUSTAINABLE 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
INTRODUCTION
Given the large quantities of public procurement, 
government purchasing power has huge potential 
to nudge markets towards higher standards of 
sustainability. The concept of SPP envisages public 
authorities demanding, for example, that their 
purchases of wood products are manufactured from 
legally harvested or sustainable timber, that public 
buildings meet ecological standards, that clothing 
for State employees is made in a healthy labour 
environment devoid of child labour, or that coffee 
served by public bodies is produced under fair 
conditions. In SPP, VSS are used to identify sustainable 
products; thus it can significantly contribute to scaling 
up VSS and influence their uptake. This chapter first 
introduces public procurement. Next, the notion of 
sustainable public procurement and how VSS are 
related to SPP are presented. The chapter ends 
by presenting some important considerations and 
discussion points on the linkage between VSS and 
sustainable public procurement.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
Government agencies use public resources for the 
purchase of goods and services to operate. Such 
purchases are known as public procurement or 
government procurement. There are various definitions 
of public procurement. According to Arrowsmith and 
Kunzlik (2009: 9), “Public procurement refers to the 
buying by the public sector of […] goods, services and 
works”. Public procurement is defined by the OECD 
(2020) as “the purchase by governments and state-
owned enterprises of goods, services and works”. 
And according to the European Commission (2020), 
it is “the process by which public authorities, such 
as the government departments or local authorities, 
purchase work, goods or services from companies”. 
The functional objectives of public procurement 
include, among others, minimizing corruption in the 
award of public contracts, driving market innovation, 
fostering industrial development and promoting 
competitive markets (Bleda and Chicot, 2020; Dawar 
and Oh, 2017; Caldwell et al., 2005).30 Additionally, 
public procurement is recognized for its role in 
promoting and encouraging social, environmental 
and other societal objectives (Arrowsmith and 
Kunzlik, 2009). The European Commission, among 
other regional and international organizations, 
acknowledges the importance of public procurement 
in boosting economic growth and creating a socially 
inclusive economy (European Commission, 2020). 
Public procurement features prominently on the 
agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO). To 
ensure openness, integrity and transparency in the 
conditions of competition in government procurement 
30 For additional sources, see also Rolfstam (2013); and 
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The political decisions on if and how to implement SPP are based on the multilevel regulatory framework 
for public procurement (Stoffel, 2020). Over the last 30 years regulations by supra- and international 
institutions slowly gained importance in answering the question if and how SPP can be put into practice. 
In many countries, public procurement, including the use of VSS, has stopped being solely dependent 
on national regulations. The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has often been viewed as a hindrance to considering sustainability criteria in public procurement. 
In the academic discourse as well as through reforms over the years, it has become increasingly clear 
that this is not the case. However, clarification is still needed, especially concerning social aspects, to 
enable and promote national legislation in favour of SPP. The underlying idea of international regulations 
on public procurement has been to liberalize procurement markets by opening them up to the parties to 
the agreement, and therefore “to bring government procurement under internationally agreed trade rules” 
(WTO, n.d.a). In the initial General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), regulations relating to public 
procurement were explicitly excluded. In the course of trade liberalization, public procurement was first 
addressed as a plurilateral agreement in the Tokyo Round Code on Government Procurement of 1979. 
During the Uruguay Round, the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) was signed in 1994 by 
some of the GATT parties. In the WTO, the agreement was revised and the still plurilateral GPA entered 
into force in 2014 (see figure 6). These regulations within the GATT and WTO which should guarantee fair 
competition in national procurement markets, have occasionally been interpreted as potentially inhibiting 
SPP regulations and practices.b
Figure 6
Development of procurement regulations within plurilateral agreements under the WTO
• Follow up of the Tokyo Round 
Code on Government Procurement 
of 1979
• Agreement on Government 
Procurement (AGP) signed in 1994
• Revision of AGP resulted in 
Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA) in 2014
• Only 48 of 164 WTO member States 
have ratified the GPA
• One of the work programmes for 
improving the implementation of 
the GPA aims to “to promote the 
use of sustainable procurement 
practices”
• Parties treat SPP as an option, but 







Box 2. SPP and the WTO Government Procurement Agreementa
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On the question of whether sustainability criteria were in violation of the principle of non-discrimination in 
the AGP, some scholars believed this was not the case, based on the fact that the principle of sustainability 
is also embodied in the foundation of the WTO (Perera et al., 2007). Furthermore, including sustainability 
aspects in public procurement (i.e. labour standards) could be justified by the AGP’s emphasis on the 
adoption of international standards and therefore “withstand[s] the ‘unnecessary obstacle to trade’ test” 
(Perera et al., 2007: 18).
Eventual, sustainability considerations were actively included in reforms of the GPA. Nonetheless, the 
discussion has continued along the lines of a general bias towards the environmental dimension of 
SPP (Stoffel et al., 2019). While environmental considerations are explicitly mentioned in the GPAc social 
considerations are not. This still negatively affects some interpretations of GPA regulation with regard to 
social criteria in public contracts (Semple, 2017). 
Despite the ongoing discussions as to whether SPP is compatible with WTO provisions, Parties to the 
agreement have regulated in favour of SPP, including its social provisions. While the EU and its member 
countries, as well as many experts, see leeway for beneficial regulations on SPP, there is also still room for 
doubt as long as social aspects in public procurement are not explicitly included in the agreement. This 
is also the case for the widespread use of transnational private regulations (TPRs), such as VSS, to verify 
compliance with sustainability criteria of bidders for public tenders. So far, TPRs are still in a regulatory 
grey area vis-à-vis the GPA (Corvaglia, 2016).
In the GPA, SPP is addressed in Article XXII as a topic for implementation and for further negotiation of the 
agreement, and was discussed at the GPA symposium in February 2017. Many speakers expressed the 
view that sustainability objectives could already be implemented in compliance with the GPA principles 
(WTO Secretariat, 2017). As a result, the WTO Secretariat proposed three options for parties to the GPA 
to go forward with SPP:
• Using the already provided policy space within the GPA,
• Officially clarifying the “scope for implementation of sustainability objectives under the Agreement”, or 
• Adding amendments to the GPA “to more explicitly reflect […] the social in addition to the environmental 
dimensions of sustainability” (WTO Secretariat, 2017). 
So far, no further actions have been taken on the matter. While this does not hinder the consideration of 
social criteria in SPP and the use of VSS in practice, Parties to the GPA should push for clarification in 
order to facilitate and foster beneficial legislation on SPP.
a Contribution from Tim Stoffel, DIE.
b The influence of the GPA on the global development of regulatory frameworks for public procurement is limited mostly to 
OECD countries. Thus far, only 48 of the 164 WTO member States have ratified the GPA, among them are all the 28 EU 
member States. Some large developing countries only have observer status (e.g. Argentina, Brazil and Indonesia).
c In Article X on possible technical specifications.
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markets, several, but not all, WTO members have 
signed up to the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) (WTO, n.d.a).31 This agreement 
was first negotiated in 1979 at the Tokyo Round, and 
has since then undergone several revisions, the latest 
being in April 2014. The GPA’s three main pillars are 
non-discrimination, transparency and procedural 
fairness (see box 2).
Public procurement is potentially an enormous 
force for market transformation and for VSS uptake 
(see below on link between VSS and sustainable 
public procurement). The WTO (n.d.a) estimates that 
government procurement accounts for up to 15 per 
cent of an economy’s GDP, and OECD data indicate 
that general government procurement by OECD 
countries was, on average, around 13 per cent of their 
GDP in 2017 (figure 7). According to the European 
Commission (2020), EU countries annually spend, on 
average, 14 per cent of their GDP on the purchase of 
goods, services and works (amounting to roughly €2 
trillion per year).
Source: OECD.32
31 So far, GPA is the only legally binding framework within 
the WTO that focuses on public procurement. 
32 OECD (n.d.). Public Procurement. Available at: https://
www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/ (accessed, March 
2020).
Observing a 10-year trend, the figure shows 
consistency in the share of public procurement in 
OECD countries’ GDP, apart from a temporary peak 
in 2009-2010 following the financial crisis. Looking 
at cross-country dynamics, Finland, Japan, the 
Netherlands and Sweden have the largest share of 
public procurement expenditures, ranging between 
16 and 18 per cent. On the other hand, Colombia, 
Costa Rica and South Africa spend only between 7 
and 12 per cent of their GDP on public procurement.33 
However, this share tends to be higher in several 
middle-income countries and LDCs. In India, for 
example, total government procurement is estimated 
to vary between 20 and 30 per cent of GDP,34 and for 
Indonesia, it is estimated to be about 50 per cent.35
33 In 2017, public procurement expenditures in OECD 
countries accounted for 30.45 per cent of total government 
expenditures on average.
34 Sources: National Platform in reference to the 2019 
budget statement. https://qcin.org/indiapssplatform/ See 
also UNODC (2013); Prasad (2018). 
35  Input received from the National Platform in reference to 
2019 budget statement. www.bsn.go.id
Figure 7



































Given its size, public procurement can play an 
important role in fostering sustainable development. 
A growing body of evidence suggests that, in recent 
years, sustainable procurement has developed and 
been widely adopted by public authorities throughout 
the world (Andrecka, 2017). The term “sustainable 
public procurement” is used to refer to socially and 
environmentally friendly public procurement policies. 
SPP is a means to ensure that public contracts 
contribute to governments’ broader environmental 
and social policy goals (Sjåfjell and Wiesbrock, 2015). 
It grew out of initiatives that focused on Green Public 
Procurement and, later, on Social Public Procurement 
in different countries (D’Hollander and Marx, 2014). 
Initially, several countries started to develop and 
adopt Green Public Procurement in a desire to green 
their economies (UNEP, 2017). Later, there was a 
growing trend to integrate social dimensions into 
public procurement policies (McCrudden, 2004), 
along with attention to fair trade elements, which are 
increasingly promoted by (local) public authorities as 
a sign of their commitment towards sustainability (Fair 
Trade Advocacy Office, 2020). In public procurement, 
it is, arguably, the inclusion of the environmental 
dimension that has made the most progress so far; 
but, increasingly, the social dimension is beginning 
to receive greater attention.36 Box 3 discusses some 
of the opportunities, risks and dilemmas of pursuing 
human rights, including labour rights, which are often 
captured under the social dimension of sustainable 
public procurement.
36  For more details, see Martin-Ortega and O’Brien (2019). 
The further incorporation of the social dimension in 
sustainable public procurement can be illustrated 
by the approach currently taken by the European 
Union. It operationalizes SPP based on some key 
international conventions and commitments, including 
conventions on labour rights (figure 1). For example, 
a set of harmonized rules on public procurement 
are embedded in European Union law. Public 
procurement legislation is based on three directives: 
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, Directive 
2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors, and Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of 
concession contracts.37 Article 18(2) of Directive 
2014/24/EU, Article 36(2) of the Directive 2014/25/EU, 
and Article 30(3) of Directive 2014/23/EU ensure that 
public contracts with economic operators comply 
with a set of pre-determined criteria and obligations 
stipulated in environmental, social and labour laws. 
In particular, the articles specifically forbid any 
violation of the environmental, social and labour laws 
contained in a number of international conventions, 
such as the ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of 
Forced Labour, the ILO Convention on Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Rights to Organise, 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
layer and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants, among others.38 Any violations of 
the articles stipulated in these conventions allow the 
37 The new EU Directives repeal the former Directive 
2004/18/EC and Directive 2004/17/EC.
38 Annex X of Directive 2014/24/EU, Annex XIV of Directive 
2014/25/EU and Annex X of Directive 2014/23/EU provide 
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As mega-consumers, governments have the power, and the opportunity, to shift markets towards sustainable 
production. For decades, governments have sought to use procurement to advance public policy goals. However, 
only recently have such goals evolved to advance public bodies’ contribution to sustainability via purchasing. 
Early international standards focused on ensuring minimum labour conditions in relation to work performed on 
the public’s account.b At national level, the focus was on integrating marginalized groups into labour markets. 
During the 1990s, however, “Green” procurement, which focused on reducing the environmental impacts of 
public buying, rose in prominence. Agenda 21, resulting from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, for example, called 
for governments to exercise environmental leadership through public purchasing,c and resulted in further green 
procurement initiatives by international organizations, such as the OECD and the United Nations (McCrudden, 
2007; Perera et al., 2007).
More recent developments have created explicit links between procurement and the multiple dimensions of 
sustainability: economic, environmental and social, the latter encompassing respect and protection of human 
rights. Besides the SDGs, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), 
endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011, stipulate that governments have a duty to 
protect human rights, which extends to procurement (UNHRC 2008; 2011). Steps are gradually being taken 
to align procurement law frameworks, such as the WTO Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA) (see box 2), the Model Law on Public Procurement of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the European Union’s procurement Directives, to accommodate such norms. In 
this context the multiple facets of sustainable public procurement are becoming more prominent in normative, 
regulatory and practical developments. This box explores the opportunities, risks and dilemmas related to one 
specific aspect: public procurement and human rights. 
In general, the shift towards sustainable procurement presents important opportunities for public buyers and 
policymakers. This is true also regarding the use of public purchasing to advance respect for and protection of 
human rights, both at the national and global levels, via public supply chains. 
First, there is an opportunity for contracting authorities to identify, prevent and mitigate human rights abuses 
through innovative approaches. Committed public buyers can play a pivotal role in overcoming some of the 
characteristic weaknesses of professionalized social audit of supply chains, for instance, where they collaborate 
to support worker-based monitoring of shared supplier codes of conduct (Claeson, 2019; Stumberg and 
Vander Meulen, 2019; Martin-Ortega and O’Brien, 2019; O’Rourke, 2003; LeBaron et al., 2017; Outhwaite and 
Martin-Ortega, 2017; 2019). Collaborative buying models offer opportunities to reduce the price paid for goods 
produced in a manner that respects human rights. Through experience sharing amongst buyers, they also 
provide a broader field of data on which to base learning and, so, increase the effectiveness of human rights-
based interventions (Göthberg, 2019). In addition, they signal to the market that public buyers prefer to work with 
suppliers that have the capacity to assess human rights supply chain risks and provide remedies where abuses 
are found to occur (Stumberg and Vander Meulen, 2019).
Such benefits are demonstrated by the following pioneering experiences. Sweden’s county councils have 
integrated human rights considerations into their procurement, adopting a collaborative model for purchasing 
high-risk goods within the health-care and electronics sectors. This has demonstrated the practical viability of 
introducing human rights considerations into government buying procedures. Further, studies show that such 
measures can be effective in improving conditions for supply chain workers while also delivering resource and 
efficiency benefits for public buyers (Göthberg, 2019; Swedwatch, 2015). In the electronics industry, public 
buyers have shown how they can establish, monitor and enforce human rights standards for workers in their 
supply chains via human rights contract clauses. Contract clauses create obligations for suppliers to engage 
with buyers and local monitoring organizations to monitor working conditions in factories which manufacture 
products and components for such buyers. Through these contractual obligations, public buyers guarantee 
Box 3. Public procurement and human rights: Opportunities, risks and dilemmasa
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active worker involvement in the monitoring of supply chains and the facilitation of processes which help address 
systemic barriers to remedy in case of abusive labour conditions (Claeson, 2019). Norwegian legislation obliges 
public authorities to include clauses on wages and decent working conditions when purchasing construction 
and cleaning services, and facility management services. Buyers are required to follow up on the performance 
of such clauses, for instance, by requiring supplier self-declarations (O’Brien et al., 2015). In March 2020, the 
Government of the United Kingdom published a Modern Slavery Statement that assesses the risk of exploitation 
in its own supply chains for products and services, which amount to an annual spending of around £50 billion. 
This statement, requires all government departments to report annually on their efforts to combat modern 
slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains.d  
Given the weight of public procurement spending in the global economy, the second opportunity is to use 
such procurement to address human rights-related sustainability issues with the aim of contributing towards 
achieving “responsible business” as defined by the UNGP (OECD, 2017). Moreover, given the emphasis of 
the 2030 Agenda on the role of the private sector, including via development partnerships, infrastructure and 
finance, public procurement should be seen as a key enabler that contributes to the realization of the SDGs 
(O’Brien and Martin-Ortega, 2017). 
Thirdly, trends in regulation towards corporate due diligence and disclosure obligations will eventually turn 
the spotlight back on government conduct and consumption (O’Brien and Martin-Ortega, 2019). Engaging in 
sustainable procurement initiatives now will prepare public buyers for the higher levels of political and public 
scrutiny expected in the future. This should also lead to improved monitoring of compliance with production 
standards to which suppliers are bound through contracts, including codes of conduct. In turn, this could yield 
stronger accountability and remediation for human rights abuses in government supply chains. 
In terms of risks, failing to integrate sustainability into public procurement law, policy and practice may result 
in serious human rights abuses of supply chain workers and of those in their communities, both inside and 
outside domestic borders (Sinclair, 2019; Martin-Ortega and O’Brien, 2019; Emberson and Trautrims, 2019; 
Stumberg and Vander Meulen, 2019; Claeson, 2019; Quinot, 2019; Russo, 2019). Failure to assess human 
rights in the context of procurement of public services will also have consequences for the human rights of 
public service users, particularly where these are people from groups at risk of discrimination, vulnerability or 
marginalization. Determining the legal liability of public buyers for such abuses is a complex issue (Russo, 2019; 
Conlon, 2019; O’Brien, 2018; Martin-Ortega and O’Brien, 2017). Nevertheless, public buyers associated with 
such harms risk reputational damage (Göthberg, 2019; Sinclair, 2019; Stumberg and Vander Meulen, 2019; 
Claeson, 2019). Second, buying relationships may be disrupted if they result in harmful impacts on workers or 
services users, or are deemed by stakeholders as ethically unacceptable on other grounds.  This can bring 
operational challenges, for instance, where replacement service providers must be substituted at short notice. 
Finally, politically, there are limits to the extent to which public buyers can continue to promote sustainability 
agendas among businesses if they fail to practice sustainable procurement themselves (Göthberg, 2019).
Turning to dilemmas for public buyers, one is whether to act on their human rights obligations, or let their 
apparently conflicting duties under extant procurement rules (e.g. where these dictate selection of the most 
economical bid regardless of other factors) prevail. This is because “policy coherence” demands not just 
“vertical” consistency of domestic law and policy with international human rights commitments, but also the 
“horizontal” alignment of standards observed by public buyers with those applicable to the private sector. Yet, 
current procurement law frameworks, although more flexible than they once were, are still not flexible enough 
to accommodate measures required to guarantee respect for human rights in practice. A second dilemma is 
how to balance transparency with the legal demands of competition and confidentiality to which public buyers 
are bound.e Third, at the level of buying entities, procurement professionals must balance their organizational 
objectives and internal procedures, as well as budget and capacity constraints, alongside sustainability goals. 
For example, it may be hard to weigh the trade-offs between the immediate local costs of more personnel and 
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training, potentially higher contract prices for responsibly sourced goods, and the longer term, more remote 
costs that may be associated with human rights abuses in supply chains.f A change in production models 
necessarily leads to a change of cost/price calculations, as it may involve an increase in price, or at least a 
reassessment of what is most advantageous in terms of social, environmental and product life-cycle conditions. 
It also means that new resources would need to be deployed in order to undertake these evaluations, understand 
and assess risks and implement plans to address them. Staying at the level of practice, a fourth dilemma is 
how to implement such measures within their own processes. For instance, buyers could adopt a “tools” 
approach by internally developing their own procedures and milestones; alternatively, they could outsource 
these processes to other organizations with whom they can establish partnerships. Supplier standards could 
be defined via the incorporation of references to technical specifications in social labels (see section on ‘VSS 
in SPP’) (Marx, 2019b), or via partnerships with third-party organizations which establish and monitor specific 
standards, such as Electronics Watch with regard to procurement of electronics. The organization not only sets 
a series of labour rights standards but also undertakes the monitoring of such standards through local partners, 
which ensure oversight of supplier human rights commitments through  worker-based monitoring (Claeson, 
2019; Outhwaite and Martin-Ortega, 2019).
Finally, at least in theory, strict competition-based procurement rules should carry a potential dividend. Making 
the limited budgets of governments, intergovernmental organizations and development finance institutions 
stretch further through more efficient purchasing could foster the realization of socioeconomic rights, especially 
in an era of austerity or public health crisis (CESR, 2020). Such rules might also encourage growth, albeit 
indirectly, if they contribute to market integration and increased trade, and thereby help uphold and strengthen 
economic and social rights, for instance by alleviating global poverty. On this view, restricting competition in 
the context of the procurement process, even if it aims to advance the human rights of smaller segments of the 
population engaged in production, might be seen to entail a trade-off. However, based on the above arguments 
and evidence, and based on mounting evidence of the benefits of sustainability for corporate and investment 
performance, we suggest that this dynamic seems more imagined than real.
To conclude, urgent action by governments and other stakeholders is needed to accelerate and scale up 
innovations in responsible public procurement that respects the human rights of workers, service users and 
the community at large. Removing residual legal and policy barriers to integrating human rights into public 
purchasing is a first step. Sustained efforts for strengthening individual buyer and collectively responsible 
procurement capacity, sharing good practices and lessons learned will be critical to securing the necessary 
transition to a sustainable global economy and society in the long run.
a Contribution by Claire Methven O’Brien and Olga Martin-Ortega. See further: Martin-Ortega and O’Brien (2019). 
b ILO, Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention (No. 94); Recommendation No. 84.
c United Nations Conference on Environment & Development (Agenda 21), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992, para. 
4.23. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf
d While reporting under the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 does not generally extend to government buyers, the UK government 
aimed to set an example for all public purchasers. According to the statement, the UK government’s efforts to combat 
modern slavery in its supply chain include direct engagement with around 400 suppliers and delivering training to over 250 
government commercial staff, among other initiatives. The statement is available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/uk-government-modern-slavery-statement (accessed 17 May 2020).
e Shown by Stumberg and Vander Meulen (2019) as a crucial lever in improving supply chain human rights standards.
f Further explored in the interesting case study provided by the CLES (2011).
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respective authorities to refuse to award tendering 
contracts to an economic entity.39
SPP is considered to bring several social and 
environmental benefits, in particular it can contribute 
to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and 
resource efficiency, as well as foster social inclusion 
policies, and fair and equal labour and employment 
practices among others. In so doing, it can also 
significantly contribute to achieving the SDGs. There is 
an obvious link to SDG 12 on Sustainable Consumption 
and Production, but also to SDG 8 (Decent Work and 
Economic Growth), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and 
Infrastructure), SDG 14 (Life Below Water) and SDG 
15 (Life on Land), as detailed in the introduction to this 
report. This contribution to the SDGs through SPP 
is explicitly mentioned by several countries. Mexico 
and Indonesia, for example, refer to the SDGs in their 
further operationalization of SPP.40 As a result, several 
governments have been introducing sustainability 
concerns in their procurement policies, to which 
the 130 members of the One Planet Network testify, 
although their level of ambition can vary (box 4).
Hence, via SPP, governments can deliver key policy 
objectives related to sustainable development. With 
a view to the economic, social and environmental 
aspects of SPP, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) regards sustainable public 
procurement as “a process whereby organizations 
meet their need for goods, services, works and 
utilities in a way that achieves value for money on a 
whole life basis in terms of generating benefits not 
only to the organizations, but also to society and 
the economy, whilst minimizing the damage to the 
environment” (UNEP, 2012). The rising importance 
of SPP is illustrated by various initiatives taken by 
UNEP, such as the Sustainable Public Procurement 
Initiative (SPPI) launched at Rio+20 in 2012, which 
subsequently transformed into the One Planet 
Network SPP Programme in 2014. This programme, 
involving more than 130 member countries, is a 
multi-stakeholder global platform that supports the 
implementation of SPP around the world. UNEP 
has also developed SPP Implementation Guidelines 
that aim to guide governments, policymakers and 
practitioners in the design and implementation of 
39 In accordance with Article 56(1)(b) of Directive 2014/24/
EU and Article 76(6) of Directive 2014/25/EU.
40 Input received from the National Platforms.
SPP policies and action plans (UNEP, 2012). Between 
2012 and 2017, these Guidelines provided support to 
13 countries in their development and implementation 
of SPP plans in combination with other ongoing 
capacity-building projects at the time.41 SPP action 
plans were implemented at local, regional and global 
levels. For instance, UNEP initiated projects aimed 
at establishing a network of experts to disseminate 
best practices, benchmark policies and develop 
cooperation with a focus on knowledge transfer 
from developed countries to developing countries.42 
More recently, UNEP launched additional SPP 
projects, within the frameworks of the United Nations 
Development Account (UNDA) initiative and the 
EU4Environment initiative.43 The latter, supported 
by the European Union, seeks to bring about policy 
and legislative changes towards greener public 
procurement policies, which in turn is expected to 
induce greener investment planning, as well as the 




The previous section has described the rise and 
growing importance of SPP. In this development, VSS 
play a specific and increasingly significant role since 
they are often integrated into the operationalization 
of SPP practices (D’Hollander and Marx, 2014; 
D’Hollander and Tregurtha, 2016; Marx, 2019b). In 
public procurement, VSS currently operate on the 
basis of an elaborate set of rules and procedures to 
ensure that producers and all actors in the supply chain 
conform with a given set of social and environmental 
standards (figure 1). D’Hollander and Marx (2014) 
have shown that VSS play a role in sustainable public 
procurement. However, the development of SPP 
41 For example, the “Stimulating the demand and supply 
of sustainable products through Sustainable Public 
Procurement and Ecolabelling” (SPPEL) project in Ukraine, 
and the “Eastern Partnership Green Project” (EaP Green 
Project) in the Republic of Moldova.
42 Such projects include the ASEAN+3 GPP and the 
Ecolabelling Project funded by China and the Republic of 
Korea, as well as the Compras Sostenibles in Latin America.
43 The UNDA initiative is “Enhancing sustainable public 
procurement for regional transition to inclusive green 
economy in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia 
(EECCA).
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This box reports on how Mexico, Indonesia, India, China and Brazil deal with sustainability considerations in 
their public procurement policies, and details how sustainability currently is considered in public procurement, 
based on contributions received these countries’ National Platforms.a
Mexico
Mexico has integrated sustainability considerations into both the objectives and principles of its policy on public 
procurement. The Budget Expenditure Federation has developed several programmes aimed at improving 
social protection of individuals, and, more generally, at achieving key sustainability objectives. These include: 
programme for the well-being of the elderly, pension programme for people with disabilities, national ‘Benito 
Juarez’ scholarship programme for well-being, youth constructing the future programme, youth writing the 
future programme, sowing life programme, national reconstruction programme, urban development and 
housing programme, and batches for well-being programme. The structure of the Budget Expenditure 
Federation’s programmes has been linked to the SDGs since 2018, and relies on core sustainability principles 
such as universality, inclusion and “leaving no one behind”.
Indonesia
In Indonesia, several laws and regulations at different levels integrate sustainability principles in the public 
procurement system, although no specific technical instructions related to sustainable public procurement exist 
yet. National laws and regulations provide the legal basis for some general sustainability principles, including 
Law Number 32 of 2009 on Environmental Protection and Management, the Government Regulation Number 
46 of 2017 on Environmental Economic Instruments, and the Presidential Regulation Number 59 of 2017 on 
The Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
More specifically, the Presidential Regulation Number 16 of 2018 on Government Procurement of Goods/
Services defines and provides guidelines for sustainable public procurement through three articles. Article 
1 §50 defines SPP as “the Procurement of Goods/Services which is intended to achieve benefit value that 
is economically beneficial not only for Ministries/Institutions/Regional Apparatuses as their users but also for 
the people, and significantly reduce negative impacts upon the environment in the whole cycle of their use”. 
Article 19 §1 (c) prescribes maximum use of green industrial products in public procurement. Article 68 states 
that “procurement of Goods/Services shall be carried out with due observance of sustainability aspects (…) 
[which] consist of: economic aspects including the cost of producing goods/services throughout the life of the 
relevant goods/services; social aspects including empowerment of small-scale businesses, guarantees of fair 
working conditions, empowerment of local communities/businesses, equality, and diversity; and environmental 
aspects including the reduction of negative impacts upon health, air quality, soil quality, water quality and use 
of natural resources in accordance with the provisions of the prevailing laws and regulations”. Paragraph 3 
of the article also specifies the bodies responsible for sustainable public procurement: “Sustainable Public 
Procurement is performed by: the PA/KPA in planning and budgeting the Procurement of Goods/Services; the 
PPK in preparing technical specifications/KAK and draft contracts in the Procurement of Goods/Services; and 
the Selection Committee/Procurement Officer/Procurement Agent in preparing the Procurement Documents”. 
A pilot process was launched in 2019 to promote sustainability considerations in public procurement through 
the use of labels, based on the Minister of Environment and Forestry Regulation Number P.5/MENLHK/SETJEN/
KUM.1/2/2019 about Procedures for the Application of Environmentally Friendly Labels for Procurement of 
Environmentally Friendly Goods/Services.
Box 4. Sustainability considerations in public procurement: Selected countries
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India
At present, India does not have any national policy governing public procurement. The General Financial Rules 
and Procurement Manuals of the Department of Expenditure provide some directives with regard to public 
procurement, such as Rule 173 (xvii) (Department of Expenditure, 2017) on the procurement of energy-efficient 
electrical appliances, which urges the procuring entity to ensure procurement of only those electrical appliances 
that have the notified Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) star rating, but the General Financial Rules allow the 
procuring authority to decide on the sustainability criteria for procurement. In the absence of rules at the 
central level, central and state ministries, public sector enterprises and government departments independently 
consider the inclusion of sustainability aspects in their procurement processes and take initiatives to promote 
sustainability on a needs basis. 
Some government agencies have thus started internalizing sustainability considerations in their procurement in 
a project-specific, decentralized manner, with a particular focus on energy conserving equipment. For example, 
the Indian Railways, in its Vision 2020 statement (National Academy of Indian Railways, 2020), aims to reduce 
carbon emissions through several initiatives, including phasing out incandescent lamps and introducing compact 
fluorescent lamps, establishing mandatory compliance with the Green Building Code in all new projects, and 
introducing rooftop solar panels at railway stations. In addition, the Ministry of Railways has established the 
Indian Railways Organization for Alternate Fuels, which is exploring renewable energy sources for the railways 
(Ministry of Railways, 2012). As a second example of project-specific sustainability considerations in public 
procurement, the Airports Authority of India has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Solar 
Corporation of India to install rooftop solar power plants at various airports (Airports Authority of India, 2018).
Taking note of the potential benefits of sustainable public procurement, a Task Force on Sustainable 
Public Procurement was set up under the Ministry of Finance to thoroughly understand the advantages 
of implementation of sustainable public procurement in India as well as the challenges (Department of 
Expenditure, 2018). Moreover, voluntary schemes such as the Indian Certification for Medical Devices Scheme 
and AYUSH premium mark have been developed to facilitate the incorporation of sustainability principles in 
public procurement (Quality Council of India, 2020a and b).
China
Currently, there are no VSS in reference to the public procurement in China. Sustainability considerations are 
entrenched in China’s public procurement policy based on the “Notification on adjusting and optimizing the 
government procurement execution mechanism for energy-saving products and environment label products” 
issued jointly by the Ministry of Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment, and the State Administration of Market Regulation of China. This Notification aims 
to improve the sustainable public procurement policy, simplify the government procurement mechanism for 
energy- and water-saving, as well as for ecolabelled products, and optimize the participation of suppliers in 
government procurement activities. It stipulates that government procurement of energy-saving products and 
ecolabelled products shall be managed by means of an itemized list format. Accordingly, a “List of government 
procurement items for energy-saving products” and a “List of government procurement items for environment 
label products” have been issued and contain 18 and 50 items respectively. Each item does not indicate any 
specific brand or product, but with reference to the minimum standard requirement. Any item that meets the 
requirement of the standard can be purchased through public procurement. Currently, all the standards in 
reference are either national standards or sector standards. They are all mandatory public standards which 
can be viewed publicly.
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For the product categories not included in the lists of items, buyers are encouraged to comprehensively 
consider energy-saving, water-saving, environmental protection, recycling, low-carbon, renewable, organic 
and other factors, and also to refer to relevant national standards, sector standards or association standards. 
Resource: http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/zcfg/tflb/jnhb/
Brazil
In Brazil, the key legal instrument integrating sustainability considerations in public procurement is the Decree 
7.746 of 2012.b It establishes national guidelines and criteria for SPP, including: low impact on natural resources 
such as flora, fauna, air, soil and water; preference for materials, technologies and raw materials of local 
origin; greater efficiency in the use of natural resources such as water and energy; greater generation of jobs, 
preferably employing local labour; longer useful life and lower maintenance costs of assets and buildings; use 
of innovations that reduce pressure on natural resources; ensuring the sustainable origin of natural resources 
used in goods, services and construction; and use of wood and non-wood forest products originating from 
sustainably managed forests or reforestation. The Decree 7.746 also establishes a consultative body – the 
Interministerial Commission on Sustainability for the Federal Administration (CISAP),. The CISAP seeks to 
communicate all discussions related to sustainability to the Federal Government, and proposes strategies to 
raise awareness among civil servants on sustainability issues as well as rules for the implementation of SPP.
Some other regulations relating to SPP include: Item VI of Article 170, and Article 225 of the Constitution of 
1988 relates to environmental matters;c Law 12.349 of 2010,d  which replaced Law 8.666 of 1993, embeds 
environmental principles in the national public procurement law; Normative Instructions No. 01 of 2010, No. 10 
of 2012, and No. 2 of 2014 regulate environmental public procurement;e Decree 2.783 of 1998 regulates the 
acquisition of materials that can damage the ozone layer;f Law 6.938 of 1981 establishes the national policy for 
environmental protection;g and Decree 9.373 of 2018 regulates environmentally friendly sales and donations.h
Lastly, several current initiatives are promoting sustainability considerations in public procurement in Brazil. 
An example is the Family Agriculture Food Acquisition Program, which establishes a minimum percentage 
of acquisition of food products from small farms, in accordance with Law 11.326 of 2006. In addition, in 
the procurement of services, contractual obligations in public contracts should ensure that suppliers collect 
and adequately discard fluorescent light bulbs. Further, Article 12 of Law 8.666 of 1993 provides that the 
procurement of civil engineering services should seek economies in the maintenance and operationalization 
of buildings, reduction of energy and water consumption, and the use of materials with lower environmental 
impact.
a For Mexico: Direccion de Normas, Ministerio de Economia Mexico; for Indonesia: LKPP; for India: Quality Council of India; 
for China: China Association for Standardization; for Brazil: Secretariat of Management at the Brazilian Ministry of Economy.
b Available in Portuguese: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/decreto/d7746.htm 
c Available only in Portuguese at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm
d Available only in Portuguese at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12349.htm
e Available only in Portuguese at: https://comprasgovernamentais.gov.br/
f Available only in Portuguese at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/d2783.htm
g Available only in Portuguese at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L6938compilada.htm
h Available only in Portuguese at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2018/Decreto/D9373.htm#art18
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policies does not imply a straightforward recognition 
of VSS by governments. In the majority of legal 
frameworks for public procurement, the principle of 
equal treatment and non-discrimination prevents 
contracting authorities from referring to one specific 
VSS in public procurement tenders, except when there 
are enough certifiers in the market to assure equal 
treatment, non-discrimination and fair competition. 
However, VSS may be referred to indirectly in SPP 
through the inclusion in public tenders of sustainability 
criteria that are similar to standards set by VSS, or 
by making reference to VSS as a form of proof of 
compliance with the criteria stipulated in tenders, 
for instance in buying guides.44 As a result, in daily 
procurement practice, VSS serve as indicators of 
social and environmental performance, and may be 
used as a convenient means of assessing a bidder’s 
credentials.
Moreover, the use of VSS in SPP is present, de facto, 
at least in some European and Asian countries, since 
other means of reliable verification of compliance 
with environmental or social standards are not 
always available or achievable. In theory, contracting 
authorities always have to accept other means of 
reliable verification, and several of these exist, such 
as bidder declarations that underline commitment 
towards social responsibility, or a list of relevant 
measures in the procurement contract itself (Vasileva 
et al., 2012). However, while contracting authorities 
are experimenting with new ways to verify social 
responsibility and sustainability,45 it seems that strong 
alternatives to VSS remain limited; many contracting 
authorities lack the expertise and capacity to verify 
compliance with different sustainability requirements 
(D’Hollander and Marx, 2014), especially when 
they buy transnationally. In the case of fair trade 
public procurement, for example, public buyers rely 
almost entirely on existing “ethical” VSS to provide 
44 See for example, the Buying Green Handbook of the 
European Commission, available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/environment/gpp/pdf/Buying-Green-Handbook-3rd-
Edition.pdf or the Buying Social guide available at: https://
op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/cb70c481-
0e29-4040-9be2-c408cddf081f. For a full overview of 
relevant documents, see the Public Procurement Guidance 
of the European Commission available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/regiona l_pol icy/sources/docgener/guides/publ ic_
procurement/2018/guidance_public_procurement_2018_
en.pdf 
45 See contributions in Martin-Ortega and O’Brien (2019).
the basis for verification of social responsibility and 
sustainability of suppliers’ goods or services (EFTA, 
2010). For certain product groups, such as fair trade 
coffee or fruits, VSS are likely to be the only proof of 
compliance available to verify ethical or social criteria. 
In other words, there are few, if any other, compliance 
mechanisms that effectively monitor fair-trade criteria 
across national borders. 
To sum up, when demanding higher environmental, 
social or fair-trade standards in government 
contracts, procurement officers can rely on VSS for 
verifying suppliers’ compliance with those standards, 
although not all VSS have the same level of credibility. 
Some organizations actively promote VSS as the best 
option to pursue sustainable development through 
public procurement.
The importance of VSS can be gauged by looking 
at the different SPP practices across countries. 
Examining how various countries approach SPP, 
different patterns or practices emerge (UNEP, 
2017), but some common elements can also be 
identified. According to UNEP’s approach, a fruitful 
implementation of SPP requires several steps, of 
which VSS are an important one (step 4):
1. Applying sustainability criteria along the 
contracting cycle
2. Identifying needs and improving efficiency
3. Defining the specification and inviting bids
4. Using ecolabels (or VSS)
5. Evaluating and selecting suppliers (screening)
6. Evaluating bids and awarding contracts
7. Auditing and improving supplier performance
The advantage of using ecolabels or VSS in SPP is 
also recognized by other international organizations, 
such as the United Nations Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS) and the ILO.46 According to 
these organizations, the use of ecolabels provides 
greater assurance of quality and conformity with the 
sustainability criteria on which SPP is built (UNEP, 
2017). Although the importance of VSS or ecolabels 
46 UNOPS, UNEP and ILO have published A Guide to 
Environmental Labels for Procurement Practitioners of the 
United Nations System as an advisory and guidance tool in 
the application of ecolabels on procurement practices (see 
UNOPS, 2009). 
Scaling Up Voluntary Sustainability Standards Through Sustainable Public Procurement and Trade Policy
34
is increasingly recognized in SPP, it should also be 
noted that there are differences in how countries 
engage with VSS in SPP. In some Asian countries, 
there is an obligation to purchase only ecolabelled 
products, whereas in Europe, references to VSS in 
SPP are optional and promotional, in the sense of 
suggesting VSS as a means of verification besides 
other options. Moreover, in several middle-income 
countries and LDCs, SPP is developed without 
integrating VSS. Consultation with national platforms 
shows that, in these countries, the use of ecolabels is 
limited or non-existent due to the high costs related 
to obtaining VSS or to its lack of availability. There is 
indeed a wide range of products for which no reliable 
ecolabels or product standards exist, particularly in 
those countries. Lastly, countries in Latin America 
typically are reluctant to include VSS in SPP for fear 
of excluding small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) from public procurement.
While, overall, VSS are gaining recognition in SPP, the 
question remains whether such recognition can lead 
to greater VSS adoption. Several examples suggest 
that SPP could indeed increase VSS uptake. In the 
Republic of Korea, for example, since the adoption of 
the Act on Promotion of Purchase of Green Products 
(2005), there has been a spectacular increase in the 
number of ecolabelled products on its market, from 2 
721 in 2005 to 14 647 in 2017. There has also been a 
proliferation of firms producing ecolabelled products 
in the Republic of Korea, from less than 700 in 2005 
to above 3 600 in 2017 (UNEP, 2019). Other countries 
such as Japan have experienced similar trends.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
INTEGRATING VSS IN SPP
Public procurement constitutes an important 
mechanism to transform markets, and hence SPP can 
significantly contribute to sustainable development. In 
SPP, VSS or ecolabels play a potentially important 
role. As a result, the further use and integration of 
VSS in SPP could be a significant driver for VSS 
uptake, at least for a specific set of products. In order 
to further assess the potential contribution of SPP to 
the development of VSS, a number of issues need to 
be considered.
A first issue concerns the strengthening of the design 
of VSS through SPP. The integration of VSS in SPP 
can help governments purchase more sustainable 
products and provide them with additional enforcement 
mechanisms and capacity-building. This in turn can 
create a spillover effects on various VSS, in terms of 
both increasing their adoption and making them more 
reliable and credible (D’Hollander and Tregurtha, 
2016; Gulbrandsen, 2014). Several authors who have 
studied the institutional designs of VSS, have found 
significant differences between them in terms of 
reliability and credibility (Fransen, 2012; Marx, 2014a 
and b; Collins et al., 2017; Bennett, 2017; Fiorini et al., 
2016). Marx (2014a and b) has analysed the design 
of 426 VSS based on data from the Ecolabel Index 
database. He makes five observations concerning 
their diversity along different dimensions, including 
standard-setting, conformity assessment and ex-
post verification. First, there is significant variation in 
how VSS are designed. Second, most VSS have open 
and consensus-based standard-setting procedures, 
which involve several stakeholders, and therefore 
many of them score high in terms of inclusiveness. 
However, and third, several VSS have open and 
consensus-based standard-setting procedures, 
but no credible ex-ante and ex-post enforcement 
mechanisms. Fourth, many systems have open and 
consensus-based standard-setting procedures and 
third-party conformity assessment, but lack ex-post 
verification tools, such as complaint systems. Finally, 
relatively few VSS have a well-elaborated standard-
setting and enforcement design. This diversity clearly 
shows that not all VSS are equal in terms of design 
and, ultimately, their effectiveness.47
The degree to which SPP can strengthen the design 
of VSS will depend on how VSS are integrated into 
legal frameworks, and on the criteria set to recognize 
VSS in the context of SPP (Gulbrandsen, 2014). In 
order to be recognized under public procurement 
laws or directives, VSS need to comply with certain 
criteria. For example, Article 43 of the European Union 
public procurement directive (2014/14) addresses 
the use of VSS (labels and certificates).48 This article 
determines the criteria to which VSS need to adhere 
in order to be eligible for public procurement where 
contracting authorities intend to purchase works, 
supplies or services with specific environmental, 
social or other characteristics. In these cases, the 
47 On the link between institutional design and effectiveness, 
see Ostrom (2005).
48 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and 
repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 43, L 94/122.
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technical specifications, the award criteria or the 
contract performance conditions may require a 
label as means of proof that the works, services or 
supplies correspond to the required characteristics, 
provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Those 
conditions include the following: VSS requirements 
should be based on objectively verifiable and non-
discriminatory criteria; VSS should be established 
through open and transparent procedures in which 
all relevant stakeholders, including government 
bodies, consumers, social partners, manufacturers, 
distributors and NGOs, may participate; VSS must 
be accessible to all interested parties; and VSS 
requirements should be set by a third party over 
which the economic operator applying for the VSS 
cannot exercise a decisive influence.
The criteria provided in the example of the European 
Union, arguably one of the leading examples in this 
context, are quite clear. They focus mostly on the 
standard-setting process within VSS, but less on how 
VSS enforce standards (i.e. monitoring, conformity 
assessment and sanctions). If the aim is to further 
strengthen the design of VSS through SPP, more 
attention could be paid to these elements. However, 
that might result in fewer VSS available to operate in 
the context of SPP, which leads to the second issue.
Source: OECD.49
49 OECD (n.d.). Public Procurement. Available at: https://
www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/ (accessed, March 
2020).
The second issue to consider is the availability of 
VSS in the context of SPP. Chapter 1, mapped the 
sectors in which VSS are available based on the ITC 
database. At present, it is not possible to conduct 
such a mapping exercise in relation to official sector/
products classifications, which makes it impossible to 
provide a thorough assessment of the sector/product 
coverage of VSS. It is, however, possible to observe 
that there is a plethora of VSS, and they cover a wide 
range of products, but there are still many products/
sectors they do not cover. Looking at the current 
public procurement expenditure patterns in the 
different government departments in OECD countries 
in 2017 (figure 8), 31 per cent were allocated to the 
health sector, 17 per cent to economic affairs, 11 per 
cent to general public services and education, and 10 
per cent to social protection services. 
Given the importance of certain sectors for SPP, 
such as health care, it is safe to assume that no 
or few VSS are available for a significant number 
of SPP products, particularly for more technical 
materials such as electronic equipment and surgical 
disposables. On the other hand, several VSS are 
available for procurement products such as food, 
textiles, woven and non-woven products.50 This 
points to possible limits on the use of VSS in public 
50 Technical specifications nonetheless exist for such 
products, such as those developed by the International 
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Figure 8
Distribution of public procurement by function/government department in OECD countries, 2017 (per cent)
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procurement, although one could argue that VSS 
could be developed in those sectors. UNEP (2017) 
identifies six common success factors for green 
public procurement and ecolabelling programmes 
that could have a strong impact, and for which the 
importance of establishing ecolabel schemes before 
programme implementation is emphasized. Those 
success factors are:
1. Strong central government support and 
legislation for green public procurement
2. Establishing ecolabelling (VSS) schemes before 
programme implementation
3. Developing clear green public procurement 
guidelines and procedures for the staff
4. Capacity-building among the procurement staff
5. Establishing monitoring systems to improve 
social and environmental impacts
6. Communication and promotion activities
A third consideration is related to possible costs 
linked to getting certified. The issue of costs has 
been discussed extensively, and was also brought 
up in consultations with the National Platforms (ITC, 
2011a and b; Loconto and Dankers, 2014). For many 
producers, certification costs are too high. Given 
that public procurement regulation frameworks are 
strongly based on the principles of transparency, non-
discrimination and equal treatment, it is necessary to 
address the issue of the possible effects of excluding 
products or services of similar environmental and 
social quality/performance but that do not hold a 
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CHAPTER 3
DRIVERS FOR VSS ADOPTION: TRADE 
POLICY 
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid increase in global trade in the past 
few decades through global value chains, trade 
governance has gained importance.51 Multiple 
instruments are used to govern global trade flows, 
many of which can influence the uptake of VSS and 
are potentially important to further broaden their use. 
This chapter identifies four types of trade-related 
measures/instruments in which VSS already play a 
role or whose role is under consideration by States. 
These are free trade agreements (FTAs), preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) (GSP measures), market 
access regulations and export promotion measures. 
The chapter introduces each instrument, explores 
the current role of VSS in these instruments, and 
discusses possible considerations for further 
integration of VSS in them. 
VSS AND FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS
A trade agreement sets out the conditions of trade, 
including taxes, tariffs on goods and services, quotas 
or investment conditions, between two or more 
51 For a more elaborate discussion of the linkages between 
VSS and trade, see UNFSS (2018).
parties. Trade agreements are beyond WTO rules, 
as they specify trade conditions that apply only to 
their signatories (WTO, n.d.b). However, they need 
to be compatible with WTO rules and are authorized 
by the WTO provided they are notified to that 
organization for review, that non-signatories are not 
subject to greater trade restrictions than prior to the 
agreement, and are reciprocal. FTAs, or regional trade 
agreements in WTO terms, can be bilateral (between 
two parties) or plurilateral  (more than two parties). 
Although bilateral FTAs still constitute the majority 
of FTAs, the number of plurilateral FTAs has been 
increasing in recent decades. The United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), successor to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
is an example of a plurilateral FTA. Trade agreements 
have evolved over time, both in number and in 
content. Currently, 301 FTAs are in force. Emerging 
in the 1970s with the liberalization of markets, they 
increased sharply in number during the 1990s, 
corresponding to the end of the Cold War and the 
opening up of developing economies like China and 
India (figure 9). Since 2017, the increase in number of 
FTAs in force has been slowing down, with only eight 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on WTO.52
Moreover, FTAs have evolved in terms of content, 
increasingly incorporating non-trade objectives, such 
as sustainable development provisions or social and 
environmental protection provisions. Morin et al. 
(2018) examined 630 FTAs enforced between 1947 
and 2016 using the new TRade and ENvironment 
Database – or TREND, and found that the number 
of environmental norms (embodied in provisions, 
clauses or rules) in those FTAs started to grow in 
the 1970s, with a sharp increase in the 1990s. The 
authors counted 308 highly diverse and fragmented 
environmental norms across the 630 FTAs analysed. 
With regard to social protection provisions, a study 
by the ILO (2015) found that the number of FTAs that 
include labour provisions had been growing over the 
past two decades, from only 4 in 1995 (covering 0.6 
per cent of global trade) to 58 in 2013 (covering 5.5 per 
cent of global trade). About 40 per cent of these FTAs 
contained conditional labour provisions, whereas 
in 60 per cent of them, such social provisions were 
exclusively promotional. 
States therefore increasingly use FTAs as a means to 
pursue non-trade objectives by including social and 
environmental provisions in them, often drawing upon 
52 WTO (n.d.). Regional Trade Agreements Database. 
Available at: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/charts.aspx# (accessed, 
April 2020).
existing international conventions or agreements. 
These provisions are often included in a chapter 
devoted to sustainable development, which generally 
also stipulates how the environmental and social 
objectives should be reached. Here, VSS potentially 
play a role, since they also refer to similar international 
conventions and agreements. This section therefore 
analyses whether States are indeed promoting or 
imposing the use of VSS in their FTAs as a means 
to enforce social and environmental provisions. For 
this purpose, the TREND database was explored by 
searching key words that are associated with VSS, 
such as: “label”, “eco-label”, “ecolabel”, “sustainability 
standards”, “ethical standards”, “certification”, “eco-
certification”, “fair and ethical trade scheme”, and 
“voluntary market-based certification programmes”. 
In total, 19 FTAs referred to one or more of those 
words (most frequently “eco-labels”); 10 of these 
FTAs involve the European Union, and Canada and 
the United States are both parties to 3 FTAs that refer 
to words associated with VSS (table 4). 
However, provisions referring to the use of VSS (or 
associated key words) remain promotional rather than 
conditional. For example, FTAs to which the European 
Union is a party typically refer to VSS as follows: “In 
order to promote the achievement of the objectives of 
Chapter Thirteen and to assist in the fulfilment of their 
obligations pursuant to it, the Parties have established 
Figure 9




















































































Chapter 3: Drivers for VSS Adoption: Trade Policy
39
the following indicative list of areas of cooperation: 
(…) (d) exchange of information and cooperation on 
corporate social responsibility and accountability, 
including on the effective implementation and follow-
up of internationally agreed guidelines, fair and 
ethical trade, private and public certification and 
labelling schemes including eco-labelling and green 
public procurement” (Annex 13 of EU – Republic 
of Korea FTA). The EFTA – Central America trade 
agreement also states: “The Parties shall strive to 
facilitate and promote foreign investment, trade in 
and dissemination of goods and services beneficial to 
sustainable development, including: (…) environmental 
technologies, sustainable renewable energy, organic 
production, energy efficient and eco-labelled goods 
and services, including through addressing related 
non-tariff barriers; goods and services that are the 
subject of schemes such as fair and ethical trade” 
(Art. 9.7). And the Canada-Chile Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation states: “The Council may 
consider, and develop recommendations regarding: 
(…) (r) eco-labelling” (Art. 10).
As environmental and social provisions have been 
increasingly included in FTAs since the 1970s, and 
more significantly since the 1990s, the question arises 
as to whether VSS are also increasingly incorporated 
into trade agreements. It seems that before NAFTA 
in 1992, FTAs did not refer to VSS (or its associated 
words), but between 2010 and 2017, a growing 
number of FTAs referred to them (figure 10), although 
it may, however, be too early to detect a clear trend.
In sum, only a few FTAs refer to VSS, primarily those 
involving the European Union, echoing its policy on 
fair and ethical trade schemes enunciated in its Trade 
for All Strategy (European Union, 2015). Thus, there 
is considerable scope for further development and 
integration of VSS in FTAs, and this could influence 
VSS uptake. Currently, the few references to VSS 
Table 4
Trade agreements that contain references to VSS (or synonyms)
EC – CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement
EC – Central America 
EC – Republic of Korea
EC – Colombia-Peru-Ecuador 
EC – Georgia
EC – Republic of Moldova 
EC – Singapore
EC – Ukraine 
EC – Viet Nam
Canada – EC (CETA)
EFTA – Montenegro
EFTA – Bosnia Herzegovina
EFTA – Central America
USMCA  (formerly NAFTA)
Peru – United States
Republic of Korea – United States
Republic of Korea – Turkey
Colombia – Republic of Korea 
Canada – Chile
Source: Morin et al. (2018).
Note: CARIFORUM comprises the following Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and the Dominican Republic.
CETA = Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
EFTA = European Free Trade Association (comprising Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland).
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remain recommendations without requiring clear 
commitments and little permanent evaluation. More 
firm commitments, accompanied by timelines might 
also influence uptake. Such commitments could be 
formulated for specific commodities. Practitioners 
and academics have been pondering the idea of 
differentiated tariffs for certified products versus non-
certified products akin to the idea of granting tariff 
concessions in favour of green goods (Mavroidis and 
Neven, 2019). However, such an approach gives rise 
to questions about its compatibility with WTO rules 
(see also next section) and is therefore controversial.
VSS AND GSP SCHEMES
A second trade instrument into which VSS can be 
integrated are preferential trade agreements (PTAs), 
which are non-reciprocal schemes. More specifically, 
a generalized scheme or system of preferences (GSP) 
is a preferential trade arrangement by which a country 
grants unilateral and non-reciprocal preferential 
market access to goods originating in developing 
countries. This exception to the general WTO principle 
of “most-favoured nation treatment” (MFN) is made 
possible through a so-called “Enabling Clause”, which 
was adopted in 1979 by the Contracting Parties to the 
GATT 1947.53 Countries or regional blocs that operate 
53 GATT Document L/4903, Decision on Differential 
and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, adopted on 28 
November 1979.
a scheme of generalized tariff preferences54 have the 
objective of “assist[ing] developing countries in their 
efforts to reduce poverty, [and to] promote good 
governance and sustainable development” (European 
Commission, 2016: 2). The preferences take the form 
of a partial or entire suspension of import tariffs. In 
general, a country is eligible if it is classified as a 
lower-middle-income country or LDC. In some cases, 
additional preferences are awarded if a country 
complies with an additional set of requirements related 
to sustainable development, such as ratifying and 
implementing a number of international conventions 
related to sustainable development. 
Currently, 13 countries and regional organizations, 
constituting large consumer markets, operate a GSP 
scheme consisting of a general scheme for middle-
income countries and a specific scheme for LDCs. 
These countries/groupings are: Armenia, Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. 
In addition to two standard schemes, the European 
Union, Norway and Turkey provide a third scheme 
specifically related to sustainable development.
54 Regulation (EU) No 978/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, applying a scheme of generalized tariff 
preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008, recital (1).
Figure 10




























































Source: Authors’ calculation based on Morin et al. (2018).
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Among their objectives both VSS and the GSP 
schemes aim to foster sustainable development and 
good governance. For example, in the European 
Union’s “special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance” (GSP+), a 
country which commits to ratifying and implementing 
27 international conventions concerning human 
and labour rights, environmental protection and 
good governance can benefit from additional 
tariff preferences. The additional preferences are 
intended as a form of compensation, or reward, for 
having signed up to, and implementing the relevant 
international conventions. In other words, GSP+ 
“fosters the achievement of its goals by offering the 
‘carrot’ of preferences” (European Commission, 
2016: 3).
Some authors have explored the possibility of 
integrating VSS in the European Union’s GSP, since 
VSS might contribute to better implementation of 
international commitments related to sustainable 
development (Schukat and Rust, 2012; Marx et 
al., 2018; Marx, 2019a; van der Ven, 2018). One 
of the arguments in favour of this approach is that 
it would allow a more differentiated approach to 
fostering compliance with sustainable development 
requirements, since it would provide direct incentives 
to firms. As Schukat and Rust (2012) made clear, it 
allows an approach towards individual firms. Under 
the terms of the current GSP scheme of the European 
Union, States which violate their international 
commitments can face a suspension of tariff 
preferences. Such a suspension implies punishing all 
companies, including those whose production systems 
already comply with social and environmental criteria 
and some of the relevant conventions. VSS could 
directly promote the implementation of sustainability 
criteria, as stipulated in the conventions, at the level 
of economic operators, without either granting to or 
withdrawing tariff preferences across the board from 
all economic operators in that State. Hence, one key 
argument, would be that by integrating VSS into a 
GSP, not only States but also economic operators 
would contribute to sustainable development. Such 
integration of VSS might also take a promotional 
approach as is the case with the FTAs, or it could take 
the form of offering preferential market access (e.g. 
lower tariffs) for certified products. In the latter option, 
countries would need to make a distinction between 
tariffs for certified and non-certified products. The 
application of such an approach could be targeted 
towards certain sectors and commodities for which 
several VSS might be available. This could potentially 
boost VSS uptake. 
However, there are also several reservations about 
such an approach. First, if applied, it should cover all 
trade schemes administered by a country. Integration 
in trading regimes is dynamic: countries move from 
one system (GSP) to another (bilateral agreement). 
If the requirements for VSS were required solely 
in the context of the GSP or a bilateral agreement, 
it might create disproportionate costs to comply if 
these requirements no longer hold under other trade 
regimes. Second, for the tariff differentiation approach 
to work, the question arises as to whether there is 
sufficient scope to lower tariffs, in particular with 
reference to GSP systems for LDCs in which most 
tariffs are already close to zero. Third, the integration 
of VSS might negatively affect the utilization rate of 
preferential tariffs in trade regimes. The utilization 
rate indicates preferential imports as a percentage 
of eligible imports under a trade agreement, or the 
degree of usage of existing preferences (Keck and 
Lendle, 2012). Hence, it is the share of imports 
actually imported under GSP over all imports that are 
in principle eligible. Not all imports that are eligible for 
a preference will necessarily be imported under such 
a scheme for several reasons: not each shipment 
would fulfil rules of origin, and preference might not be 
claimed or granted for a specific reason. Integrating 
VSS in a trade regime might result in lowering the 
utilization rate since economic operators may not be 
able to prove that they fulfil VSS criteria, or they may 
choose not to do so because they cannot afford the 
high certification costs, or they prefer to pay the MFN 
duty rate. Especially when the costs of certification 
would outweigh the benefits of tariff reduction, 
economic operators might enter the market without 
the tariff preference. This might defeat the purpose of 
a trade regime. Finally, such an approach would need 
further scrutiny to assess compatibility with WTO 
rules, especially in relation to the principle of “like 
products” and the ongoing debate about process 
and production methods (PPMs) (Marx et al., 2018).55 
The WTO dispute settlement bodies have repeatedly 
declined to take into account differences in PPMs 
when determining “likeness” despite criticism of this 
position from academics (Bodansky and Lawrence, 
2009; Hestermeyer, 2011).  
55 For exhaustive legal analyses of compatibility with WTO 
law, see Partiti (2017 and 2021).
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VSS AND MARKET ACCESS 
REGULATION
A third measure that could have a significant impact 
on VSS uptake is market access regulation. Making 
market access conditional on certification could 
potentially create incentives for VSS adoption, but 
this approach is debatable. There is no general 
overview available on how many regulations exist 
which include VSS in market access requirements, 
but some recent examples show how this is currently 
done. One example where VSS play a role, albeit 
indirectly, is the European Union Timber Regulation 
(EUTR) which was developed in the context of the 
bloc’s 2003 Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT). It aims to tackle 
illegal timber and the associated trade by using a 
combination of demand- and supply-side measures, 
focusing respectively on the banning of illegal timber 
from the European Union market, and supporting 
forest governance reforms and law enforcement 
in timber-producing countries. The EUTR requires 
operators (from non-VPA countries56) to comply with 
a number of stringent due diligence requirements . 
These obligations apply to timber and timber-based 
products originating from both inside and outside the 
Union, in order to avoid discrimination among supplier 
countries. To verify such compliance, EUTR requires 
forest operators to exercise due diligence, which 
means European Union operators are to minimize the 
risk of illegal timber entering the value chain, and they 
can be held accountable if they fail to do so. To fulfil 
these obligations, operators can either develop their 
own due diligence system (DDS) or use one designed 
by a monitoring organization (MO) recognized by the 
European Union.57 Monitoring organizations are 
private, companies based in the European Union, 
which can be contracted by operators to provide 
them with the guidance and monitoring required to 
verify timber legality.58 Operators can also use their 
own DDS which should consist of three components: 
56 VPAs are voluntary partnership agreements which the 
European Union has with some timber/producing countries 
and which guarantee “green lane access” to the European 
market for timber originating from those countries.
57 So far, 13 MOs have been recognized. For more 
information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/
mos.htm
58 Art. 4-6 of Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying 
down the obligations of operators who place timber and 
(1) information about the operator’s supply of 
timber; (2) risk-assessment procedures; and (3) risk-
mitigation procedures.59 Under the risk- assessment 
procedures of DDSs, the EUTR encourages the use 
of VSS, or “certification or other third party verified 
schemes which cover compliance with applicable 
legislation”.60 To be recognized in this context 
VSS need to conduct regular (at least annual) and 
appropriate checks, including field visits, have the 
means to trace timber across the supply chain before 
it reaches the market, and provide controls to ensure 
that non-verified or illegal timber does not enter the 
supply chain.61
The Republic of Korea takes a similar approach, 
but recognizes VSS more explicitly. The country 
is among the ten largest consumers of timber and 
timber products worldwide, and a major importer 
and exporter of timber. Previously, it often imported 
timber from countries associated with illegal logging 
(Forest Trends, 2019). Indeed, a 2014 report stated 
that up to 36 per cent of timber products imported 
into the country were sourced from such high-risk 
countries (Lee et al., 2014). The Government decided 
to address the issue of illegal timber trade, leading to 
an amendment of the Act on the Sustainable Use of 
Timbers in 2017, which entered into force in March 
2018. Article 1 of the Act states its main purpose as 
“increasing the carbon sinking function and other 
diverse functions of timber and using the timber 
in a sustainable manner” (Korea Forest Service, 
2017). The Act specifically addresses key trade 
issues (responsibilities, import declaration, import 
inspection, revocation of registration and penalties, 
among others).
Timber importers are expected to prepare all legality 
assurance documents prior to importing into the 
country. The inspection agency designated by the 
timber products on the market. 2010. Official Journal of the 
European Union L295, 23-34.
59 Art. 4 and 6(1) ibid. 
60 Art. 6 (1)(b) ibid.
61 Art. 4 of Commission implementing Regulation (EU) No 
607/2012 of 6 July 2012 on the detailed rules concerning 
the due diligence system and the frequency and nature of 
the checks on monitoring organizations as provided for in 
Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council laying down the obligations of operators 
who place timber and timber products on the market. 
Official Journal of the European Union L177, 16-18.
Chapter 3: Drivers for VSS Adoption: Trade Policy
43
Korean Forest Service then checks those documents 
and decides whether the timber in question can 
enter the country. The implementation of the Act is 
supported by the Detailed Standards for Determining 
Legality of Imported Timber and Timber Products, 
which specify the requirements that imported and 
domestically produced timber and timber products 
need to meet. It contains an exhaustive list of 
documents and certifications that are recognized 
by the Republic of Korea as assuring the legality 
of the timber harvest. These documents include, 
inter alia, internationally recognized documents that 
certify legally felled timber or timber products (FSC, 
PEFC, country-specific PEFC certificates, third-party 
certification under ISO 17065) (Korea Forest Service, 
2018).
Complying with the Act is mandatory for all timber 
operators or traders aiming to conduct their 
activities in the Republic of Korea. The legality of the 
timber imports is supervised by the Korea Forest 
Service, which carries out pre-import controls with 
the assistance of the Korea Forestry Promotion 
Institute, an inspection agency. The Korean Forest 
Service acknowledges the exemplary practices of 
international actors such as the European Union, the 
United States and Australia in forest governance. It 
states that the Act has been revised “in response” 
to their ambitious standards and aims to “actively 
participate in international efforts to preserve the 
global forest environment and to import only legally 
harvested timber” (Korea Forest Service, 2020b).
While the Act formally recognizes VSS, which might 
create significant incentives for VSS adoption, 
especially FSC and PEFC, it is too early to assess its 
impacts in terms of the advantages and disadvantages 
of integrating VSS into these regulatory requirements.
The Republic of Korea has a long history of developing 
a well-functioning system for forest management. 
After the devastations of the Korean War, the Korea 
Forest Service undertook an extensive project of 
forest rehabilitation that was realized through five 
10-year National Forest Plans (Korea Forest Service, 
2020a). These plans and other State initiatives 
addressed questions such as deforestation and 
forest restoration, more recently with an emphasis on 
sustainable development through the “low carbon, 
green growth” vision (Lee, 2012). 
A third interesting example in which VSS directly play 
a role is the European Union’s Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED) which was adopted in 2009. RED 
does not constitute an import restriction; rather, it 
governs how goods which are entering the Union’s 
market are “marked” in terms of sustainability. It aims 
to achieve a number of mandatory targets to promote 
the use of renewable energy sources, including 
biofuels. In order to ensure that the European Union 
imports sustainable biofuels, the RED has established 
a set of sustainability criteria for biofuels, including 
environmental and social criteria.62 Recognized VSS 
provide proof of compliance with those criteria. They 
certify most of the sustainable biofuels available in 
the European Union market, both those derived from 
biomass produced in the bloc, and those imported 
from third countries (European Court of Auditors, 2016: 
17). In order to be recognized by the Commission, 
VSS are required to meet the sustainability criteria 
defined under the RED and are expected to have a 
verifiable auditing system to provide evidence of the 
particular claims they make. A key component of the 
RED is a recognition system based on substantive and 
62 The criteria set out in Art. 17 of the RED apply equally to 
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procedural requirements. Once a VSS is recognized 
by the Commission, that recognition is valid for five 
years unless the Commission decides to repeal it in 
case a scheme fails to comply with the agreed set of 
rules. After five years, an extension of the recognition 
is subject to a new decision by the Commission.63 
Currently, the Commission recognizes 14 VSS64 (down 
from the previous 19), some of which are privately 
run entities developed by groups of economic 
operators and other interested parties, often including 
NGOs (the so-called ”roundtable consortia”), while 
others have been developed by biofuel producers. 
A number of the recognized schemes are RED 
customizations of existing certification systems with 
a broader geographic and/or sectoral orientation 
beyond the European Union’s biofuels market (e.g. 
Round Table on Responsible Soy, Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biomaterals, and Bonsucro) (German 
and Schoneveld, 2011). In order to verify biofuels’ 
compliance with the RED’s sustainability criteria, 
VSS have to monitor the whole value chain – from 
farmer to biofuel producer – which adds a value 
chain requirement to the recognition system. In 
practice, this means that every economic operator 
along the value chain has to provide purchasers of 
biomass or biofuels (the next link in the value chain) 
with information about the certificate it has obtained 
and the particular sustainability characteristics of 
the products it delivers. Before an operator can be 
certified, it has to be audited by a certification body 
(German and Schoneveld, 2011; European Court of 
Auditors, 2016). 
RED provides an interesting example of how VSS are 
recognized in regulations. However, an evaluation of 
the certification of sustainable biofuels by the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA) identified a number of critical 
shortcomings in the system. The ECA evaluation 
found that the Commission’s assessment procedures 
for the recognition of VSS did not adequately take into 
account a number of critical considerations regarding 
biofuels’ sustainability. In particular, the Commission’s 
substantive requirements for VSS recognition do 
not sufficiently recognize that biofuels can have 
63 Communication from the Commission on voluntary 
schemes and default values in the European Union’s biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme, 2010/C 160/01. 2010. 
Official Journal of the European Union C160(53), 1-7.
64 For an overview of the 14 VSS, see: https://ec.europa.
eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biofuels/voluntary-
schemes 
negative socioeconomic impacts, including land 
tenure conflicts, forced/child labour or poor working 
conditions, even though these considerations are 
explicitly referred to under the RED’s sustainability 
criteria (European Court of Auditors, 2016: 8 and 21). 
In addition, it was found that the Commission granted 
recognition to VSS which did not adequately verify 
whether certain biofuels were indeed produced from 
waste, or whether biofuel feedstocks were cultivated in 
accordance with the European Union’s environmental 
requirements for agriculture. Some VSS were also 
found to be insufficiently transparent. Finally, and 
perhaps the most problematic critique of the VSS 
recognition system the ECA found was that, once a 
VSS has been officially recognized, the Commission 
does not check whether that VSS actually applies the 
certification standards it committed to in its request 
for recognition. The fact that the current system 
does not provide a specific and separate complaints 
mechanism arguably renders it even more vulnerable 
to violations, since the Commission has no means 
to detect or verify infringements (European Court 
of Auditors, 2016: 8-9). Consequently, too many 
VSS are recognized, a criticism shared by WWF 
(2013). These criticisms correspond to findings of 
other studies (Schleifer, 2013; Ponte and Daugbjerg, 
2015; WWF, 2013; Ugarte et al., 2013). In response, 
the Commission reduced the number of VSS it 
recognized from 19 to 14. 
The lesson to be learned from this is that, when 
integrating VSS into regulations, the kinds of VSS that 
are integrated and how they ensure compliance need 
to be carefully considered. As discussed in chapter 2, 
not all VSS are equal, and the integration of VSS into 
public policy should not mean that all of them should 
be recognized automatically. The discussion on RED, 
for example, indicates the importance of setting up a 
stringent, comprehensive and transparent recognition 
system which applies detailed substantive and 
procedural requirements for VSS to be integrated. 
EXPORT PROMOTION
A fourth trade-based instrument into which VSS 
are integrated are export promotion measures. VSS 
can contribute to increasing access to markets, and 
hence promoting exports (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009). Governments can engage with VSS in different 
ways to increase exports. No data are available on the 
number and nature of measures which integrate VSS 
Chapter 3: Drivers for VSS Adoption: Trade Policy
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into export promotion. However, there are several 
examples of countries that seek to promote their 
main export products through certification, some 
of which are described in this section. While these 
examples provide little evidence on the outcomes 
of the inclusion of VSS, they nonetheless serve to 
indicate different types of government engagement 
in export promotion. First, governments can make 
certification a necessary requirement for obtaining 
an export licence. Second, they can provide financial 
incentives for certification in order to promote certain 
export-oriented sectors and products. Third, they can 
engage with VSS to provide training and capacity-
building to producers in order to help them increase 
their exports. 
BETTER COTTON INITIATIVE IN MOZAMBIQUE
The second UNFSS flagship report (2016) reported 
on the collaboration between the Better Cotton 
Initiative and the Mozambique Government to 
increase the productivity and sustainability of the 
cotton sector so as to promote the country’s cotton 
exports. The Cotton Institute of Mozambique (IAM) 
engaged the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) to help 
develop improved extension services (in line with BCI 
principles and criteria). This resulted in the first “better 
cotton” harvest in 2013. BCI focuses on investing 
in capacity-building (rather than only checking 
outcomes through licensing alone). In 2014, IAM and 
BCI signed a strategic partnership agreement to 
embed BCI principles and criteria in Mozambique’s 
national regulations governing cotton growing, thus 
integrating VSS standards and procedures into public 
policy. This integration developed in stages. The first 
stage involved embedding the BCI’s principles and 
criteria into revised national cotton regulations, which 
apply to all legislation relating to granting concessions. 
In the second stage, IAM developed a national 
standard for sustainable cotton production, mirroring 
the criteria and indicators developed by the BCI, and 
included additional sustainable criteria related to 
parts of the production line not covered by the BCI 
standard. Third, once the new national standard was 
developed, the verification and licensing process was 
expected to be transferred from the BCI to the IAM 
(ISEAL, 2017a). Both the BCI and IAM are currently 
training and developing certification bodies based in 
Mozambique to carry out external third-party audits. 
The BCI standard will be embedded within this 
national-level standard and verification process, and 
the BCI will recognize Mozambique cotton through 
a benchmarking agreement. Once the national-level 
standard and verification process has been finalized, 
an agreement of “equivalence” will ensure that 
Mozambique-produced cotton will enter international 
markets as BCI-certified cotton. 
FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL IN GABON
Forests cover about 90 per cent of the Gabonese 
territory, amounting to approximately 23 million 
hectares.65 About 60 per cent of this area consists of 
40 forestry concessions. Although the contribution of 
the forestry industry to Gabon’s GDP has decreased 
over the past few decades, wood products still 
account for about 10 per cent of the country’s exports, 
with a total export value of $442 million in 2017.66  
65 World Bank (n.d.c). Forest area (sq. km and % of land) 
– Gabon. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
AG.LND.FRST.K2?locations=GA (accessed, April 2020).
66 OEC (n.d.a). What does Gabon export? Available at: 
https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/gab/all/
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Increasingly, regulations to ensure that forests are 
sustainably managed have been implemented 
in recent years, with the explicit aim to promote 
exports. More specifically, in September 2018, the 
President of the Gabonese Republic announced 
that forestry permits would be withdrawn from all 
forestry operators not certified by the FSC by 2022. 
Following that announcement, a five-year cooperation 
agreement, renewable tacitly, was signed between 
the FSC and the Government of Gabon on 31 
January 2020. It aims to “contribute to the promotion 
of sustainably managed Gabonese forests, and 
to the improvement of Gabonese certified wood 
products’ access to reference markets”.67 The parties 
to the agreement will cooperate in five main ways: 
(1) create an enabling institutional environment for 
sustainable forest management; (2) provide follow-up 
and support to forestry operators; (3) raise awareness 
about sustainable forest management and increase 
the participation of key actors, including civil society; 
(4) develop markets for sustainable wood products; 
and (5) provide capacity-building for sustainable 
forest management. A joint committee has also been 
created to coordinate, follow up and evaluate the 
implementation of specific actions (FSC, 2020). 
The Government of Gabon is making the issuance 
of forestry permits conditional on FSC certification 
in order to increase forestry exports and hence their 
contribution to GDP. The presence of the FSC in 
Gabon dates back to 2009, but since the presidential 
announcement in September 2018, 19 additional 
Forest Management (FSC-FM) and Chain of Custody 
(FSC-CoC) certificates have been issued (out of 31 
ever active in Gabon). By December 2019, FSC-FM 
certificates covered more than 2 million hectares of 
forests, almost 10 per cent of the total forest area 
in Gabon, and 12 CoC certificates are currently 
operating (FSC, 2019).
MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL IN 
SURINAME
With the increasing demand for sustainable fishery 
products (including seabob shrimps) in Europe and 
North America, the Heiploeg Group, the largest 
shrimp processor in Europe, applied to the Marine 
67  Informal translation of the cooperation agreement 
between the Ministry of Waters, Forests, Sea and 
Environment and the FSC (2020). Available at: https://www.
atibt.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/3101-Accord-de-
cooperation-FSCGabon.pdf, p.2.
Stewardship Council (MSC) in 2010 for certification 
of its seabob shrimp fisheries in Suriname (Suriname 
Seabob Fishery, 2020a). In 2011, it became the first 
fishery in the tropics to be certified by the MSC. 
This initiative encouraged the Government of Suriname 
to develop a Seabob Fishery Management Plan, 
aimed at making seabob fishing more sustainable 
and improving its access to sensitive export markets 
through the MSC label. To implement such a plan, 
the Seabob Working Group (SWG) was established 
on 1 April 2010, comprising representatives from 
Suriname’s Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry 
and Fishing, the commercial fishing industry and local 
artisanal fishers. Civil society organizations can also 
join the SWG as observers. The WWF, in particular, 
has attended most of its sessions (Suriname Seabob 
Fishery, 2020b). It meets monthly, and is responsible 
for conducting periodic stock assessments, as well 
as supporting and monitoring fishing practices to help 
fisheries obtain MSC certification (Suriname Seabob 
Fishery, 2017). The SWG Working Group therefore 
plays a key role in overseeing the management of 
fisheries, and provides a forum for discussing and 
resolving disputes (ISEAL, 2017b).
Besides providing certification, the MSC also shares 
its expertise in standard-setting, auditing and 
monitoring of fishing practices with the Government of 
Suriname and with fishery operators. The Government 
provides strong complementary operational support 
to fisheries to implement more sustainable fishing 
practices in order to facilitate the acquisition of MSC 
certification (FAO, 2018). 
This interaction between the MSC and the Government 
of Suriname have reportedly not yet yielded economic 
benefits, probably because a greater supply of MSC-
certified shrimps is needed to achieve a stronger 
position in export markets (Suriname Seabob Fishery, 
2020a). Nevertheless, the export value of Suriname’s 
fishery products increased by 51 per cent between 
2009 and 2017.68 With the growing demand for 
sustainable products by markets in Europe and North 
America , the largest export markets of Suriname’s 
fishery products, certification has the potential to play 
a significant role in promoting seabob shrimp exports 
in the future. 
68 OEC (n.d.b). What does Suriname export? Available at: 
https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/sur/all/
show/2017/ (accessed, April 2020).
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CHAPTER 4
INTEGRATING VSS INTO PUBLIC POLICY
Various issues and consequences of integrating VSS 
into procurement and trade policies arise, which 
need to be considered and discussed. These include 
capacity issues within VSS systems, the possible 
impacts resulting from the growing number of VSS, 
the implications for recognition systems, the risk of 
over-certification, and possible distributional effects. 
This chapter discusses each one of these implications 
briefly.
CAPACITY OF VSS 
Although VSS schemes recognize organizations 
that are responsible for accrediting certification 
bodies to perform assessments of conformity with 
standards, some VSS remain actively engaged with 
certified entities in order to ensure compliance with 
standards, in terms of both monitoring and handling 
complaints and disputes (Marx and Wouters, 2017). 
This might imply that some VSS can only certify a 
limited number of companies, and are not necessarily 
interested in certifying as many as possible. Some 
VSS shift their approach from one which mostly 
relies on independent third-party auditing to a system 
involving a more complex governance structure in 
which several dependent and independent actors 
provide information, expertise and capacity in the 
certification process (Loconto, 2017). VSS schemes 
that engage actively and frequently with their adopters 
might face difficulties in coping with increased 
demand. Therefore, a VSS governance model 
which only involves independent certification bodies 
for granting certificates and handling complaints 
can probably more easily cope with a significant 
increase in demand. However, even in these cases, 
a sharp increase in demand for certification could 
pose challenges, such as a lack of time to conduct 
proper and correct audits, an insufficient number of 
qualified auditors, and/or ensuring that the auditors 
are sufficiently competent.
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER 
OF VSS AND RECOGNITION OF 
VSS 
The number of VSS has been stagnating in the last 
couple of years, as mentioned in chapter 1. The 
proliferation of VSS since 1990 was considered by 
several commentators to be an issue since it risked 
creating confusion in the market due to the plethora 
of labels, some of which were pure “greenwashing”.69 
This stagnation, driven by different dynamics, 
including cooperation and mergers of VSS, is a 
possible sign of consolidation of various VSS. As 
mentioned earlier, many labels that are currently 
operating are fairly concentrated in a limited number 
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of commodities or sectors. Unfortunately, neither the 
ITC Standards Map nor the Ecolabel Index database 
use the relevant Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) product categories to provide an 
overview of which commodities are covered by VSS. 
However, it is safe to assume that, for many products 
obtained through public procurement, no VSS are 
available of (see chapter 2). This might lead to the 
creation of additional labels, which could have some 
possible negative consequences. The early days of 
VSS development took place in a context with little 
or no regulatory oversight and few rules to comply 
with. The question arises as to whether in the future 
a regulatory framework should be developed which 
deals with recognition of various VSS. Mavroidis 
and Wolfe (2017) argue that VSS should be brought 
within the normative framework of the trade regime, 
and suggest that the WTO should adopt a reference 
paper that would encourage its members to apply 
WTO rules, especially with regard to transparency 
and non-discrimination, for adopting or recognizing 
standards. On the other hand, bringing VSS into the 
normative framework could arguably disrupt their 
voluntary nature. While this debate is still ongoing, 





The previous point suggested the need to consider 
developing recognition systems which distinguish 
between credible and non-credible VSS. This is 
particularly important with regard to a possible 
upscaling of VSS use in FTAs and GSP schemes in 
order to maintain the credibility of VSS and certificates 
used by exporters. Indeed, if VSS become explicitly 
mentioned in those trade instruments, the use of fake 
VSS certificates by exporters might grow. Besides, 
credibility is crucial for upscaling VSS adoption, as 
other sustainability enforcement and certification 
instruments exist in parallel – such as ISO certificates, 
for example – and might be preferred to VSS (Potoski 
and Prakash, 2005). Recognition systems to ensure 
credibility of audits and VSS certificates should thus 
be well thought out.
Recognition systems, in different forms, are 
emerging. Chapter 2 provided the example of criteria 
applied to VSS for sustainable public procurement. 
In chapter 3, the example of the Renewable Energy 
Directive which establishes a recognition system was 
introduced. Developing recognition systems generally 
involves three types of requirements: (1) substantive 
requirements, (2) procedural requirements and 
(3) value chain requirements. The bases for the 
substantive requirements can be provided by the 
SDGs and multilateral commitments (e.g. ILO-
conventions) as is currently done (see chapter 1 for 
some examples). Procedural requirements focus 
on: (a) how standards are set, and (b) how they 
are enforced and implemented through ex-ante 
conformity assessments, ex-post verification, ability 
to signal non-compliance (complaints systems) and 
possible sanctions. These procedural requirements 
can follow existing guidelines, such as the 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation 
and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance Code of Good Practice 
for Setting Social and Environmental Standards,70 
and requirements outlined in ISO/IEC 17065:2012 
(Conformity assessment – requirements for bodies 
certifying products, processes and services) and the 
related ISO/IEC 17067:2013 (Conformity assessment 
– fundamentals of product certification and guidelines 
for product certification schemes71). Finally, value-
chain or chain-of-custody requirements might 
stipulate which types of value-chain tracking methods 
can be used: identity preservation, segregation and 
mass balance (ISEAL, 2016).
Recognition system cover several dimensions, and, 
potentially, many recognition systems might emerge. 
This creates a possible risk of proliferation of such 
systems, all with more or less similar requirements, 
but also possible small differences in requirements, 
which might make it difficult for VSS to comply with 
them all. It may therefore be important to consider 
actions to create convergence between recognition 
systems.
70 The ISEAL Standard-Setting Code conforms to a large 
extent with the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement’s Code of Good Practice, as contained in annex 
3 to the Agreement. 
71 This document describes the fundamentals of product 
certification, and provides guidelines for understanding, 
developing, operating and maintaining certification 
schemes for products, processes and services.
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OVER-CERTIFICATION
The focus of this report is on mechanisms to 
increase the uptake of VSS, for which there is 
significant scope, as noted in chapter 1. Tayleur et 
al. (2018) analysed the uptake of seven agricultural 
commodities which are generally considered to be 
significantly covered by certification: coffee, bananas, 
cocoa, palm oil, sugarcane, soy and tea. By plotting 
the certified areas against the total area in which the 
specific commodities were cultivated, they found that 
certification for these products to be low globally. Their 
analysis showed that 9 per cent of coffee production 
worldwide is certified. For the other six commodities 
the proportion of certification is even lower: only 0.3 
per cent for bananas, 2.2 per cent for cocoa and 
palm oil respectively, 0.6 per cent for sugarcane, 0.2 
per cent for soy, and 2 per cent for tea.
However, increased demand might lead to the 
problem of over-certification. VSS do not necessarily 
aim at certifying as many companies or producers 
as possible, but rather at creating certified markets. 
Hence, a key challenge for them is to have enough 
downstream players or buyers in consumer markets 
(i.e. in Europe). Integrating VSS into public policy 
might thus generate too many certified goods. 
However, not all will be sold or marked as such on 
the market. There are some indications that there 
is already an oversupply of some certified products 
on the markets, and some certified products are 
being sold without a certificate. For example, there 
are many types of tea, and Sri Lanka is a major tea 
producer of certified tea. However, the country mainly 
produces specific types of certified tea for markets 
in the Russian Federation, Turkey and West Asia 
which do not really demand certified tea. The type of 
tea demanded by the European Market is, however, 
not available in Sri Lanka due to ecological and 
geographical factors (UTZ, 2016). A measure which 
would influence uptake on a large scale might thus 
defeat the purpose of some VSS by generating an 
over-supply of certified produce. 
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
Finally, it is important to consider possible distributional 
effects of upscaling VSS. Maertens and Swinnen 
(2009) showed that VSS could be a catalyst for trade, 
but also a barrier. The case of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, raised in the Committee on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Standards of the WTO, showed 
the drastic effects of requiring VSS certification as a 
condition for entering the United Kingdom’s retailer 
market. Suddenly, farmers from Saint Vincent and 
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they could not afford the costs of certification of their 
products (Stanton, 2012). Costs as a barrier to entry 
into the VSS market can be significant. For economic 
operators, two additional costs might be involved in 
getting certified. One relates to becoming certified, 
and the other is related to higher costs of producing 
in compliance with VSS standards. Concerning 
the former, getting certified often implies additional 
investments, technical changes and corrective 
actions in order to be in conformity with standards. 
These costs can vary significantly depending on the 
steps that are still necessary in order to obtain the 
certificate. Some studies indicate that these costs 
might be very substantial. Concerning the latter, 
some studies show that production according to VSS 
is often more expensive (Loconto and Dankers, 2014). 
There are also costs related to recertification which 
need to be taken into account. 
These costs can influence the ability of producers 
to comply with or adopt VSS in order to enter some 
(export) markets (UNFSS, 2018). This might especially 
be the case for producers in LDCs. Several VSS 
try to get producers in LDCs on board, but some 
evidence suggests this is difficult because of the 
high certification costs. This problem, which Marx 
and Cuypers (2010) refer to as “stuck at the bottom”, 
results in some producers in LDCs being excluded 
from VSS dynamics. Tayleur et al. (2018) looked into 
where seven types of certified commodity crops 
are located, and whether they are located in places 
which are significant for conserving the world’s 
most important biodiversity and for benefiting the 
most vulnerable producers. They developed the first 
global map of certification of these seven commodity 
crops, synthesizing data from over one million farms 
to reveal the distribution of certification. Their study 
found that certification appears to be concentrated in 
areas important for biodiversity conservation, but not 
in those areas most in need of poverty alleviation. This 
might indicate that it is very difficult for poor farmers 
to enter the VSS market. Hence, costs related to 
obtaining VSS certification might create distributional 
effects in terms of obtaining market access between 















This report was written when the COVID-19 pandemic 
struck, sparing hardly any countries. The pandemic 
will clearly affect some of the issues discussed in 
this report. It will have an impact on globalization, 
global value chains and how we approach 
sustainable development; it might also affect the 
rules and procedures underlying (sustainable) public 
procurement; and it will affect trade policy in many 
ways. What the short- and long-term consequences 
will be is hard to assess at present. Some changes 
might be structural and more fundamental, while 
others may be only temporary.
One crucial issue the pandemic highlighted is the 
vulnerability of societies to risks affecting the health 
of people. Increased attention to health concerns – 
not only to human health, but also to the health of 
ecosystems– will, hopefully, take top priority for years 
to come. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, global 
health was affected by a virus for which no vaccine is 
yet available. However, more generally, other health 
concerns are associated with how we produce, 
consume and trade products, and to the social and 
environmental consequences of these activities. The 
severe health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 
pandemic might raise more awareness of the urgent 
need for sustainable development and sustainable 
trade, and, consequently, to increased attention to 
tools and instruments to facilitate sustainable trade, 
of which VSS are one. In order to have a significant 
impact on trade, VSS need to be used widely. This 
report has sought to map out the current trends 
in the use of VSS, and discuss some public policy 
instruments that could help scale up VSS.  
Chapter 1 explored the current trends in VSS adoption 
from different perspectives and made some key 
observations. First, globally, the number of VSS has 
been increasing since the 1990s, but the increase 
has been slowing down in recent years, to the point of 
stagnation. Second, there are significant differences in 
the number of VSS active in different countries. Third, 
for agricultural commodities, certification is gaining 
market shares, and its coverage in terms of croplands 
is growing by roughly 11 per cent per year globally, 
although it remains, overall, relatively low (1.4 per cent 
of global cropland area). Fourth, looking into country-
level adoption of VSS, it appears that countries with 
open economies, and diversified economic sectors 
and exports, which score well on governance 
indicators and have achieved a certain level of 
development (middle income or higher) tend to take 
up more VSS. Lastly, other factors such as consumer 
demand, business demand and government demand 
also play a key role in VSS uptake.
Chapter 2 analysed the role of VSS in sustainable 
public procurement. It first pointed to the importance 
of public procurement, and therefore its significant 
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then focused on sustainable public procurement 
which grew out of environmental and social public 
procurement. It showed that there are synergies 
between VSS and SPP, as VSS can serve as an 
enforcement mechanism and as proof of compliance 
with public sustainability commitments. Lastly, 
considerations such as the strengthening of the 
design of VSS, their availability, as well as the costs 
of certification were discussed in the context of 
sustainable public procurement.
Chapter 3 delved into the potential integration of VSS 
into different trade instruments. It explored how VSS 
are currently included in free trade agreements. It 
then discussed the potential inclusion of VSS in GSP 
schemes. This was followed by an analysis of how 
VSS can be used as an instrument for market access 
regulation. Finally, three ways in which governments 
can use VSS as an instrument for export promotion 
were discussed, namely conditionality, financial 
incentives and capacity-building.
Chapter 4 suggests that integrating VSS into 
sustainable public procurement and trade-based 
instruments might significantly influence their 
adoption, but raises a number of issues, including 
those related to VSS capacity, the proliferation of 
VSS, divergence and convergence of recognition 
systems, over-certification and distributional effects.
This report shows that governments can play an 
important role in upscaling VSS adoption through SPP 
and trade policy. As VSS offer considerable synergies 
with the SDGs and other public sustainability 
commitments, they are a valuable complementary 
enforcement tool to progress towards sustainability 
worldwide, although there will be many challenges to 
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ANNEX
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON 
VSS ADOPTION SCORES
This annex briefly describes the variables used in 
table 3. Trade indicators first include the Export 
Concentration index,72 also called the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index (HHI), which measures, on a 0 to 1 
scale, the degree of product concentration in exports, 
in other words, the number of different commodities 
that are exported. A score of 0 corresponds to 
very diversified exports, meaning that a significant 
number of different products are exported; a score 
of 1 refers to more concentrated exports, in other 
words, exporting only one or a limited number of 
different commodities. Then, net imports and exports 
of goods in US dollars,73 exports as a percentage of 
GDP, the share of agriculture in GDP, GDP, GDP per 
capita,74 as well as the growth rate of GDP per capita 
over the period 1995–2019 are also analysed as trade 
indicators. We present Trade Tariffs (WEF, 2019) as 
well as Trade Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2019), 
which measures the absence of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade and scores from 0 (less trade freedom) 
to 100 (most trade freedom). Moreover, the Doing 
Business index (World Bank, 2019) captures the ease 
of doing business in an economy, based on 10 topics 
and 41 indicators. Scores range from 0 for the lowest 
performance to 100 for the best performance. Lastly, 
the Global Competitiveness index (GCI) (WEF, 2019) 
measures 113 variables, which are structured into 12 
pillars of competitiveness that are further classified 
under 4 factors, namely: enabling environment, 
markets, human capital, and innovation ecosystem. 
The GCI score ranges from 0 (not competitive) to 7 
(very competitive). For assessing governance, two 
indicators are used: the Government Effectiveness 
index, which captures the “quality of public services, 
72 UNCTADstat (n.d.). Merchandise: Product concentration 
and diversification indices of exports and imports, annual. 
Available at: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/
tableView.aspx?ReportId=120 (accessed, March 2020).
73 UN Comtrade (n.d.). International Trade Statistics – 
Import/Export Data. Available at: https://comtrade.un.org/
data/ (accessed, March 2020).
74 World Bank (n.d.a.). World Bank Open Data. Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed, March 2020).
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2010). These are assessed 
on a scale of -2.5 indicating poor government 
effectiveness, up to 2.5, indicating a more effective 
government. In addition, we use the Rule of Law 
index75 to measure “perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). This scale also ranges from 
-2.5 (low level of rule of law) to 2.5 (high level of rule 
of law). Lastly, the KOF Globalisation index and the 
Human Development Index (HDI)76 are analysed. The 
KOF Globalisation index evaluates different aspects 
of globalization, including trade globalization, political 
globalization and social globalization, described as 
follows: “Economic globalization characterizes long 
distance flows of goods, capital and services as 
well as information and perceptions that accompany 
market exchanges. Social globalization expresses 
the spread of ideas, information, images and people. 
Political globalization characterizes the diffusion of 
government policies” (Gygli et al., 2019). This index 
is measured on a scale from the lowest score of 
21.87 to the maximum score of 89.88. Lastly, the HDI 
captures the level of human development of a country, 
including indicators of life expectancy, education and 
per capita income, and ranges from 0 (low) to 1 (high).
75 World Bank (n.d.b.). Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Available at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/
worldwide-governance-indicators (accessed, March 2020).
76 UNDP (n.d.). Human Development Data (1990-2018). 
Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data (accessed, March 
2020).
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